

CURRENT *History*

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FEBRUARY 1965

DILEMMA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE U.S. IN SOUTHERN ASIA	<i>William C. Johnstone</i>	65
INDIA WITHOUT NEHRU	<i>Norman D. Palmer</i>	69
INDONESIA: UNITED AGAINST PROGRESS .	<i>Benedict R. Anderson</i>	75
MALAYSIA'S FIRST YEAR	<i>C. Paul Bradley</i>	82
NEUTRALIZATION EXPERIMENT IN LAOS ...	<i>Arthur J. Dommen</i>	89
VIETNAM: THE AGONIZING REAPPRAISAL	<i>Bernard B. Fall</i>	95
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	<i>Bernard K. Gordon</i>	103

REGULAR FEATURES

MAPS • <i>Minority and Majority Populations in Indochina</i>	97
<i>Communist Tax Areas in Vietnam</i>	99
CURRENT DOCUMENTS • <i>U.N. Resolution on Cambodia</i>	109
<i>Peking Statement on Nuclear Test</i>	109
BOOK REVIEWS	111
THE MONTH IN REVIEW	117

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CURRENT History

FEBRUARY, 1965

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In this issue, seven specialists focus on south and southeast Asia in an effort to sharpen understanding of the forces at work in this pivotal area. In an evaluation of the dilemmas which face United States policy, our introductory author notes that "over the past year and a half, a changing configuration of power has been developing. . . ." There is, he says, "ample evidence that slowly and carefully the Chinese Communists have begun to build a new pro-Peking alignment. . . ."

The United States in Southern Asia

By WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE

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NO ONE CAN CLAIM that 1964 was a "vintage year" for American policy in south and southeast Asia. Although the slogan in Washington was, "hold the line until after the election," this did not stay the inexorable march of events in Asia and the rest of the world. Death and politics took its toll of leaders and governments. Jawaharlal Nehru, the charismatic leader of India's millions, is dead. Illness retired a Japanese premier in whom the United States had found strength and understanding. Politics in the Kremlin sent the peripatetic Nikita Khrushchev into obscurity on the same day that politics gave the Labor party a narrow margin of power in Britain. And in the beleaguered country of South Vietnam, changes of government seemed to accelerate to the point that an observer might well question whether any Vietnamese remained who were willing and capable of running the government of that war-torn country.¹

¹ Wesley R. Fishel, "U. S. Fighting Wrong War," *Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., November 29, 1964, Section E.

The ouster of Khrushchev coincided with another event of even greater importance for Asia and the United States. Communist China exploded its first nuclear device. United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk had warned the world that this was a near possibility and United States intelligence was able to pinpoint the site of the explosion. Even so, Rusk's cautious optimism indicating that one bomb is not a nuclear arsenal, and that a complex delivery system would take years to develop, did little to lessen the political tremors that shot through every Asian government from Japan to Afghanistan. That the Peking regime is still behind in the nuclear race is cold comfort to the free countries of Asia whose leaders are now forced to face some hard facts about the future security of their countries.

If United States policy, as distinct from action, seemed to rest almost on dead center during 1964, not much else in Asia did. Of South Vietnam, at the end of November Professor Wesley Fishel wrote,¹ "The plain

fact is that the Republic of Vietnam is disintegrating. The process of decay is vivid and poignant." Destruction of over \$15 million worth of United States planes near Saigon in October only served to highlight the fact that the war against the Vietcong seemed hardly more successful than the efforts of the weak Vietnamese government even to maintain its authority in Saigon. In Laos, no progress was made towards the planned "neutral" government, while the Communist Pathet Lao forces continued to dominate two-thirds of the country. The unpredictable Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, after eliminating all United States economic assistance programs, received new support from Communist China and continued carping at alleged border violations by South Vietnamese and United States forces. Then, with rumors that he intended to break relations with the United States completely, a conference was planned in New Delhi where Cambodian and American representatives would talk things over.

In spite of efforts by the United States and the Philippines, conferences between Indonesia and Malaysia failed to reach agreement on a truce or ceasefire in Indonesia's confrontation policy towards Malaysia. New guerrilla raids along the Malayan coast extended the area of danger while President Sukarno continued to insist that the creation of Malaysia was a threat to Indonesia's security and a "plot" against his country by the "imperialists" of the West. In this situation, as in Laos and Cambodia, a sudden turn of events or a flaring of tempers could well produce more serious hostilities. On the subcontinent, the change of government in India following Nehru's death seemed to have quieted the emotions of Indians and Pakistanis on the Kashmir issue, but like other conflict situations, the surface calm could be broken at any time.

These situations in south and southeast Asia are related to problems confronting the United States elsewhere. Decisions on the next steps in South Vietnam are complicated by Peking's possession of nuclear capability, however small at present, and by the change of government in the Kremlin, which can-

not yet be adequately assessed. The new Soviet government through the *Tass* news agency has declared that, "Those who harbor adventurist plans with regard to the Indochina peninsula should understand that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the fate of a fraternal Socialist country, and is ready to render the necessary assistance." This declaration, obviously in response to rumors that the United States would extend the war to North Vietnam, casts doubts on the finality of the Sino-Soviet split and emphasizes the danger of escalation of the conflict in Vietnam which could lead to Chinese and even Russian intervention.

In addition, our European allies, particularly the French and British, already at odds over the future of NATO and the United States proposal for a multilateral nuclear force, are in no mood to support enlargement of the warfare in southeast Asia. France, in particular, has proposed a different course, "neutralization," and has begun to reestablish its influence in Asia, opening diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists. Whatever United States policy evolves for south and southeast Asia, therefore, will have to be closely related to United States efforts to repair the NATO alliance and to structure relations with the new masters of the Kremlin. The net result is that, for 1965, the United States is confronted with a series of policy dilemmas in Asia more difficult of solution than any since the first American sailing ship entered the port of Canton before our own revolution. These policy dilemmas are made more intractable and complex by their obvious inter-connections with equally grave policy questions relating to Europe and the Soviet Union.

It is less useful to recapitulate the events of 1964, a truly frustrating year for American foreign policy generally, than to attempt to define the dimensions of the policy dilemmas confronting us in southern Asia now. Only by attempting this analysis can the scope of the clear and present danger to the United States be understood. For the danger is present and policy decisions cannot long be postponed.

DANGER IN SOUTHERN ASIA

The alternatives which now confront the United States in South Vietnam illustrate our difficulties most clearly. Here, it is generally conceded that the deterioration in the home government and in the war against the Vietcong have definitely narrowed the choices open to us. It is easy to assert now that we cannot succeed in our objectives there unless a Vietnamese government can win the confidence of the people and that this can only be done when the Vietnamese army, with American help, can establish security for those who have been harried and attacked by the Vietcong. It must be conceded, however, that long years of conflict and the nature of the guerrilla war have eroded the will of the people and, in Saigon, have resulted in an alarming increase of political in-fighting in which a growing number of factions—military, political, Buddhist, Catholic and young people—are struggling for power with unhesitating use of demonstrations, mass protests and violence.

It is unthinkable that the United States would move into the country directly, take over the conduct of the warfare against the Vietcong, and attempt to build and manage a government for Saigon and the countryside. Apart from other difficulties this would offer convincing proof of the Communist charge of "imperialism" daily leveled against our government. For the United States to carry the war to the north on any large scale would have the same result. It seems generally agreed in Washington that the United States should avoid either horn of this dilemma, not just because of the grave difficulties involved but because we do not know, nor can we accurately anticipate, the reactions of Peking or Moscow. To choose a course that might bring Peking and possibly Moscow into active armed intervention against us would be to risk an escalation of the conflict into nuclear war.

Other alternatives, however, seem just as risky. The United States has little inclination to negotiate its way out of South Vietnam as long as it can bargain only from

weakness and not from a position of strength. Further military action of a limited nature, to interdict supply lines to the Vietcong, also carries risks of possible retaliation from North Vietnam, from Communist China and, if Cambodian territory should be involved, from that country and its "staunch friend," the Peking regime. Our dilemma in South Vietnam, then, can be best met by asking which are the least risky actions we can take to convince the Ho Chi-minh regime in the north that we intend to go the course to prevent South Vietnam from being taken over. What kinds of action can we take to shore up the faltering regime in Saigon and local governments in the provinces and, at the same time, to diminish the areas of Vietcong control? It may well be that the United States can do little except to hold the line as taut as possible until the turn of events and circumstances elsewhere provide more elbow room for action.

Whatever decisions are made regarding South Vietnam, there still remain the difficult situations in Laos, Cambodia and the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation. In these conflict situations, much will depend upon the course of events in Vietnam. If American policy and action appear weak or vacillating, Communist China's influence with Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia is likely to grow; a stalemate in Vietnam might induce the Peking regime to attempt more vigorous action in Laos and Cambodia to further disrupt and erode the United States position in Asia. President Sukarno might be persuaded or persuade himself that more vigorous action against Malaysia would be profitable. If open warfare broke out in Laos or Cambodia or between Indonesia and Malaysia, the dangers of escalation and open conflict with Communist China would be just as great as they are in Vietnam.

The foregoing conflict situations tend to capture the headlines, but there are other dilemmas for our future Asian policy. How can we continue to give economic and military aid to both India and Pakistan and keep Pakistan as a SEATO ally? What more can be done to help these two nations come to

terms on Kashmir so that the energies and emotions directed against each other over this question can be diverted to more constructive and positive endeavors? How can we manage our relations with the Philippines and with Thailand so that these allies will remain as allies and work with us towards our common goals of preventing Communist expansion in southeast Asia? What role do we believe Japan should play in the economic and political areas of action in south and southeast Asia? For the first time since World War II, a Japanese premier, Eisaku Sato, has announced his belief that Japan should be able to play a more active role in Asian affairs.

THE COMMUNIST SHADOW

Over all these dilemmas of policy hangs the shadow of Communist China. How long can, or should, the United States stand as the intransigent foe of Communist China's participation in international diplomacy and conferences? Is it at all possible to proceed with any agreements with the Soviet Union on reduction and control of nuclear weapons systems without securing agreement from Communist China? Are the Chinese oligarchs in Peking so intent on achieving great power status (the kind of status sought by General Charles de Gaulle for France) that they will proceed with their nuclear arsenal and refuse to bargain until they have this power? What can the United States do to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia? These are all questions which are closely related to our problems with the NATO alliance and with the future of our relations with the new Soviet leaders.

From this very brief statement of our difficulties in southern Asia, some conclusions can be drawn. First, over the past year and a half, a changing configuration of power has been developing in southern Asia. While the amount of attention given in the press to the war in Vietnam gives the impression that this is our most urgent and pressing policy problem, and this may be so at the moment, there is abundant evidence that the attention of Peking is by no means focused solely on

this jungle and rice-paddy war. There is ample evidence that slowly and carefully the Chinese Communists have begun to build a new pro-Peking alignment in southern Asia, which could result in a fairly solid and cohesive bloc of states under Peking's influence or virtual domination.

Today, Chinese Communist influence is probably stronger than United States and Western influence in Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia and Ceylon. Chinese relations with Pakistan have resulted in weaker Pakistani ties with the United States. This steadily growing Chinese Communist influence could result, not in the states of southeast Asia falling like dominoes if Vietnam goes from bad to worse, but in the development of governments so "neutral" as to cause the gradual elimination of American and other Western interests. This has already occurred in Burma. How long Prince Sihanouk can play off French interest in his country against an expansion of Chinese Communist interests is questionable. The Indonesian Communist party is reportedly behind Communist China to a very large degree. Ceylon is going in the direction the Chinese Communists wish for all new states—widespread socialization and reduction of Western interests.

This potential development would force the United States to decide how to protect the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia from Communist infiltration and intervention, and whether such action would have the support of our other allies, Japan and Australia in particular. In fact, to take an even gloomier

(Continued on page 114)

William C. Johnstone, in addition to his work at Johns Hopkins, has taught at George Washington University where he also served as Dean of the School of Government. He was U.S.I.S. director in India during 1946-47 and an advisor to the U.S. Mission to Nepal in 1947, after which he served in the Department of State until 1953. A frequent writer on Asian politics, Mr. Johnstone's most recent book is *Burma's Foreign Policy—A Study in Neutralism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.)

"The political scene in India has changed considerably since Nehru's death," writes Norman D. Palmer. "The peculiar quality that Nehru gave to Indian politics is missing, and the outlines of the new political style are not yet clear." Here this author evaluates . . .

India Without Nehru

By NORMAN D. PALMER

Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

WITH the death of Jawaharlal Nehru on May 27, 1964, India faced a crisis of leadership and a crisis of confidence. Both crises have been surmounted, at least temporarily, but they may recur in even more serious form; and in the meantime new crises have had unhappy repercussions on both domestic and foreign policies.

Charismatic leadership at the top has been succeeded by collective leadership. The new prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was the compromise choice of a dominant group in the topmost ranks of the Congress party. Apparently Kamaraj Nadar, president of the Congress and former chief minister of the State of Madras, is the key figure in this ruling group, with Atulya Ghosh and S. K. Patil, party bosses in West Bengal and Maharashtra respectively, his most effective supporters. Ghosh and Patil are hardy perennials in the Congress party, but Kamaraj Nadar represents a new type of leadership which may become increasingly influential in future years.

Nadar is a relative newcomer to the national scene, although he attracted nationwide attention by his firm administration of Madras State. He belongs to a caste which is relatively low in the caste hierarchy, but which has been growing in influence in Madras. He speaks only one language, his native Tamil. Even if he were multilingual, he would still be difficult to understand, for he is a man of few words and his approach to

politics is rather unique. Yet he is obviously shrewd, forceful and efficient. He seems relatively devoid of personal ambition, a man of unquestioned integrity and real stature. If Lal Bahadur Shastri proves incapable of measuring up his new responsibilities as prime minister, or if he has to retire for reasons of health—and he has already suffered one "mild heart attack" since he assumed office—Kamaraj Nadar will probably have the major voice in the choice of Shastri's successor.

Before a "consensus" on the succession was reached, a short but intense struggle for leadership took place behind the scenes in the topmost ranks of the Congress party. The chief contender for the post of prime minister, in opposition to Shastri, was Morarji Desai, a leader of the conservative wing of the Congress, who was supported by a strange assortment of Congress leaders who for various reasons were reluctant to approve the nomination of Shastri. Among these were V. K. Krishna Menon, K. D. Malaviya, former minister for mines and fuel, B. Patnaik, former chief minister of Orissa, and other left-wingers in the Congress ranks; a few formerly strong Congress leaders in the states, notably Pratap Singh Kairon in the Punjab and C. B. Gupta in Uttar Pradesh; and for a time Jagjivan Ram, the "untouchable" veteran cabinet minister, who had been disgruntled ever since his resignation was accepted by Nehru in August, 1963. But the Kamaraj group prevailed, and Morarji and

his supporters had to accept the verdict in favor of Shastri with as much good grace as they could muster.

The crisis of confidence is even more disturbing. Nehru was uniquely a symbol of the Indian nation, and no one can take his place as India's main unifying force. It is natural that many Indians should feel that the Indian ship of state is drifting, now that the great captain is gone. This feeling has been accentuated by an accumulation of domestic and external troubles since Nehru's death. Even nature has frowned upon India more severely than usual. In the summer of 1964, some parts of the country—especially the Punjab and the Delhi-New Delhi area—experienced the worst floods in 40 years, a result of one of the wettest monsoons on record. Other internal troubles have been at least partially man-made. These included further communal riots, chiefly in Kashmir and in Western India, following the worst wave of communal rioting since the partition period; an aggravated food crisis, which Shastri has called India's "most formidable problem"; a sharp rise in prices, which along with food shortages has imposed new hardships on the Indian people, especially in urban areas; other economic difficulties which have led to serious shortfalls in achieving the targets of the Third Five Year Plan; and what seems to be an increase in corruption and black market operations. The harvests of late 1964 and increased shipments of food-grains, mostly wheat, from the United States alleviated the food crisis for the time being, but the long-term problem remains unsolved. Food production in 1963–1964 was less than 80,000,000 tons, even less than during the last year of the Second Five Year Plan (1960–1961), and India's population is increasing by more than 10,000,000 every year.

Nationwide emergency rule continues. It was imposed in late October, 1962, following the Chinese attack. Many Indians feel that its continuance is now unnecessary and that in fact it endangers constitutional liberties. The national budget has been raised to well over \$4 billion annually, and over one-third of this is allocated to defense. The official

position of the Indian government is that the emergency cannot be permitted to slow down the pace of national development, but the emergency since late 1962 has undoubtedly placed new burdens on limited resources.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The political scene in India has changed considerably since Nehru's death. The peculiar quality that Nehru gave to Indian politics is missing, and the outlines of the new political style are not yet clear. There are still strong leaders in the country. Some of these are readily identifiable, but most of them are relatively obscure, almost faceless men whose exact roles and abilities are still unknown. Dissatisfaction with Congress rule is frequently voiced, as it has been for many years, but it has not yet made much of an impact on the strength of the Congress on the national level. The position of the party has improved in some states, but in others it has deteriorated.

In two states, in particular, the Congress is facing a real crisis. In the Punjab the strong man of the party, Pratap Singh Kairon, a Sikh who was chief minister for eight and one-half years, was forced to resign after the damaging disclosures of the S. R. Das Enquiry Report and after Nehru's death deprived him of his main pillar of support. The new chief minister, Ram Kishen, a Hindu, is a compromise candidate, with little independent political strength. The Punjab has become a real headache for the Congress party.

The Congress position is even more alarming in the problem state of Kerala, where it has been in trouble for many years. On September 8, 1964, a group of Congress dissidents joined with opposition members of the Kerala Legislative Assembly to topple the Congress government headed by R. Sankar, a leader of the low-caste Ezhava community, the largest community in the state, and shortly thereafter President's Rule was proclaimed, as had been done in 1959 after a Communist government had been in power in the state for two years. In November, an attempt by the central government to impose

food rationing in Kerala, without first accumulating enough grain stocks to assure a minimum ration, broke down, and for about two weeks Kerala experienced not only a serious food shortage but also a virtual breakdown of law and order, with mobs demonstrating in front of Government House in Trivandrum, the capital of the state, attacking government officials, and raiding storehouses for rice and wheat.

Elections are scheduled in Kerala in February or early March, 1965. Unless the Congress high command can bring the warring groups in the party in Kerala into agreement, and unless the economic situation improves, it is probable that neither the Congress nor the Communists will gain a working majority in the state's legislative assembly. Kerala is a hotbed of Communist activities and of communal rivalries—meaning in this case mainly Hindu-Christian rivalries, although there are communal differences within both Hindu and Christian communities and the Muslim League is a factor in the northern part of the state.

None of the opposition parties seems to have benefited from the new problems facing the Congress party, largely because of internal divisions and rivalries. Every one of the opposition parties that claims to be national in character—the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra, the Communist, and the new United Socialist party (Samyukta Samajvadi party)—seems to be losing strength rather than gaining in political influence and support. In a country dedicated to the welfare state, national planning, and the “socialist pattern of society,” no conservative party, whether of a communal or non-communal variety, has much of a chance in national politics, although it may have real strength in certain parts of the country.

The S.S.P., formed in June, 1964, by a merger of the Praja Socialist party and the Socialist party of India (the Lohia Socialists), is a strange amalgam of diverse groups and clashing personalities. When it was formed, some of the former members of the two parties that merged refused to enter the new party; some former leaders of the merg-

ing parties, including Asoka Mehta, now Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, have even joined the Congress.

The top leadership of the Communist party is split, chiefly into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet wings. This split has seriously weakened the influence of the party on the national scene. It has had appreciable but lesser effects in the states; but in many parts of the country, notably in Kerala, the split in the party and the unpopularity of an association with the Chinese Communists have not seriously affected the support which the party enjoys among people who tend to vote for Communist candidates for more immediate reasons and who are not greatly interested in or well informed regarding national and international issues.

INDIAN DEFENSES

Early in 1964, the Indian government prepared a Five Year Defense Plan, which called for a major buildup of India's defense forces to a strength of 825,000 well-equipped men, a 45-squadron air force, replacement of obsolete aircraft, improvement of air defense, radar and communication facilities, replacement of over-age warships, expansion of defense production, improvement of road communications in border areas, and organizational improvement. Obviously such a stepped-up defense program will necessitate an increase in defense expenditures, and will add greatly to the foreign exchange needs for defense purposes.

In May, Y. B. Chavan, India's defense minister, visited the United States, and obtained an agreement from the United States government to provide an immediate credit of \$10 million for the purchase of defense articles and services and the modernization of ordnance factories; to continue military assistance at the same levels as in 1963–1964 for equipping Indian mountain divisions and for providing air defense communication equipment, transport aircraft, and road-building equipment; to provide a further credit of \$50 million during fiscal year 1965; and to hold periodic discussions with Indian officials to determine the extent and nature

of further United States assistance to India's defense effort. When Chavan raised the question of replacing over-age warships, he was advised to discuss this matter with the British government. Later in the year, he conferred with British officials in the new Labor government. Apparently he was able to lay the basis for further discussions, but he did not obtain a positive agreement that Britain would help India to meet its needs for more modern warships.

The United States also steered shy of any commitment to provide India with supersonic aircraft, but it sent a team of experts to India to determine whether it could be of any assistance in this regard. India will depend largely on developing facilities for manufacturing HF-24s, India's only supersonic fighter, and MIG-21s, with Soviet assistance, and on obtaining some supersonic aircraft from the Soviet Union. Chavan received a sympathetic hearing when he visited the Soviet Union in August–September, 1964. A concrete result of his visit was a Soviet agreement to extend and expand the agreement of August, 1962; to speed up assistance for the production of MIG aircraft in India; to provide India with enough MIG-21s to re-equip three fighter squadrons with these aircraft; to supply some light tanks, and also 20 Mi-4 helicopters. There is a possibility that the U.S.S.R. will also make available some naval craft, perhaps including one submarine.

The spectacle of a nonaligned India turning to both the United States and the Soviet Union for military assistance is a strange one, which is viewed with considerable misgivings by many Americans, and by many Indians as well. In this case, however, the interests of all three nations seem to coincide; the main reason for this apparent coincidence is, of course, Communist China. As *The New York Times* observed editorially on September 13, 1964:

The prime purpose of this military help is to strengthen India's military capabilities in the event of a new Chinese invasion. Put in other words, Soviet military aid to India today has much the same immediate motivation in terms of

India's needs as the similar help being given by the United States. The now obsolete cold war stereotypes no longer explain this kind of co-operation between the capitalist United States, neutralist India and Communist Russia against the imperial designs of Communist China.

For continuing economic aid, as well as for military assistance, India looks mainly to the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Its foreign exchange needs now run to more than one billion dollars a year. Most of this is made available by the capital-exporting nations of the West and Japan, which cooperate in the ten-nation International Consortium (the "Aid-to-India Club"). On May 26, 1964—the day before Nehru died—the Consortium announced a pledge of \$1.028 billion for the fourth year (1964–1965) of India's Third Five Year Plan. About half of this will be provided by the United States. Thus India will continue to be the largest single recipient of United States economic aid.

The Soviet Union in 1964 agreed to co-operate in the expansion of the steel plant at Bhilai, built with Soviet assistance, and in the construction of a fourth steel mill in the public sector at Bokaro, a project which, after several years of investigation and negotiation, the United States decided not to support. The U.S.S.R. has also entered into other agreements for economic assistance in recent months. In October, 1964, the new Soviet Prime Minister, Aleksei Kosygin, assured Mrs. Indira Ghandi, who was in the U.S.S.R. on an official visit, that there would be no change in Soviet economic, technical and other aid programs to India.

The outline of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1966–1971), approved by the National Development Council in late October, 1964, suggests that this Plan will call for a total expenditure of about \$45 billion, almost twice as much as the expenditures of the Third Plan. Apparently the Fourth Plan outline assumes that foreign aid will continue for the next several years at existing levels; additional resources must be found by "activizing" every sector of the economy. Even so, the Fourth Plan outline contains a gap of

some \$6 billion between proposed investment and estimated available resources.

Since the Chinese attack and India's military humiliation, India's prestige in foreign affairs has been noticeably less, especially among the other nonaligned nations of Asia and Africa. The loss of its great international statesman has had a similar effect. His successors as prime minister and foreign minister (he held both positions) are men of little international experience. Shastri, in fact, had never been outside the Indian subcontinent prior to his appointment as prime minister. Since then he has made two trips abroad—to Cairo in October, 1964, to attend the conference of nonaligned nations, and to the United Kingdom in December of the same year. He was unable to attend the conference of Commonwealth prime ministers in London in July, 1964, because he was incapacitated at the time by his heart attack. At this conference India was represented by T. T. Krishnamachari, the finance minister, and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, minister for information and broadcasting. Swaran Singh, the first Indian to hold the post of minister for external affairs independently of any other position, has traveled rather extensively since he was appointed on July 18, 1964—to Nepal, Burma, Afghanistan, Ceylon, the U.A.R., the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries. Y. B. Chavan, the defense minister, has visited the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in pursuit of assistance for India's Five Year Defense Plan. In June and July, 1964, Zakir Husain, vice president of India, made a three-week good-will visit to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In mid-September President Radhakrishnan made a state visit to the U.S.S.R. But on the whole the new leaders of India have not played an active role on the world stage.

Relations with Nepal and Ceylon have been considerably improved. Swaran Singh's first visit outside of India after he became foreign minister was to Nepal. In 1964, India and Nepal signed several agreements, providing for Indian assistance to Nepal's development efforts. In late October, the

prime minister of Ceylon, Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaike, came to India to discuss with Prime Minister Shastri the future of some 975,000 stateless persons of Indian origin in Ceylon. On October 28, the two governments signed an agreement which seemed to bring to an end a controversy which has been a stumbling block in Indo-Ceylonese relations for many years. According to this agreement, 300,000 persons of Indian origin in Ceylon will be granted Ceylonese citizenship; 525,000 will be repatriated to India and granted citizenship within a period of 15 years; and the status and future of the remaining 150,000 will be agreed on later.

In recent months, various efforts have been made to improve relations between India and Pakistan, which had further deteriorated since the Chinese attack on India and the breakdown of Indo-Pakistan talks on Kashmir between late December, 1962, and mid-May, 1963. During the last months of his life, Nehru gave special attention to Indo-Pakistan relations, and there were indications that he was willing to take a more flexible position than usual on the Kashmir question. On April 8, 1964, Sheik Abdullah, the "Lion of Kashmir," who had been in custody since August, 1953 (except for a few months in 1958), was released by the government of Kashmir. In late April and early May he conferred with Nehru in New Delhi, and he also talked with many other Indian leaders. In May, he went to Pakistan to meet with Ayub Khan and other Pakistani officials. Since his release, he has been demanding some settlement that will take into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

Several developments since Nehru's death have raised hopes for a new era in Indo-Pakistan relations. Lal Bahadur Shastri was known to be interested in an improvement in these relations. A good impression was created when Ayub Khan extended good wishes to Shastri when the latter became prime minister of India, and when Shastri replied in kind. On October 12, 1964, Shastri stopped off in Karachi on his return from the conference of nonaligned nations in Cairo to confer with Ayub Khan. In a joint

communiqué, the two leaders proclaimed their desire for improved relations and announced "that discussions between the two Governments at appropriate levels should be held at the earliest possible moment." This agreement seemed to symbolize the happier atmosphere in Indo-Pakistan relations, and to offer grounds for hope for really substantial improvement. Earlier, Jayaprakash Narayan, the *sarvodaya* leader, went to Pakistan at the head of an unofficial Indian delegation, and after talks with Ayub Khan and other Pakistani officials he announced that there was a real wish for peace in Pakistan.

In spite of all of these encouraging developments, however, no real progress seems to have been made in resolving the perennial Kashmir problem or in overcoming mutual animosities and suspicions. Pakistan is still disturbed by India's military buildup since the Chinese attack, which it insists adds to its own peril, and India is disturbed by Pakistan's growing associations with Communist China. Neither Ayub Khan nor Shastri is in a position to make any bold new moves or any real concessions in the near future. Thus for both countries their mutual relations remain at once the most important and the least satisfactory aspects of their foreign policies.

Since their voluntary withdrawal from most of Indian territory in NEFA (North East Frontier Agency) and Ladakh in November, 1962, the Chinese Communists have not resorted to further military action against India. But they remain in strength in Tibet, the Aksai Chin section of Ladakh, and elsewhere along India's Himalayan frontiers, and they have shown no interest in reaching a negotiated settlement of their dispute with India. Hence India continues to be concerned about the possibility of further difficulties with China, and it is building up its defense forces in order to be in a better position to resist another Chinese attack. When the Chinese exploded an atomic bomb in mid-October, 1964, Prime Minister Shastri condemned this act as "a danger and menace to mankind." Alarmed by this new development, some Indians, including even some members of the Congress party, demanded

that India, too, should make nuclear weapons; but Shastri, mindful of the heritage of Gandhi and Nehru, reaffirmed his Government's policy of striving "to eliminate this menace of nuclear bombs rather than . . . adding to it." If, as seems almost certain, China continues to develop its nuclear capacity, this issue will doubtless be raised again and again, even in the land of nonviolence.

On September 18, 1964, at the end of a five-day debate in the Lok Sabha (the Indian House of the People) on a no-confidence motion (which was defeated by a vote of 307 to 50), Prime Minister Shastri said that his Government "would continue to follow the policies of the late Prime Minister Nehru in the international field—disarmament, peaceful co-existence and nonalignment—and in the domestic field—establishment of democratic socialism in the country in which the common man . . . would have a better deal." Shastri is particularly sensitive to charges (often made by his political opponents) of deviation from the policies pursued by Jawaharlal Nehru. He was a devout follower of Nehru, in more than a political sense. But inevitably the end of the Nehru era marked a great change in the character and style of Indian politics, if not in basic lines of policy. However faithful Shastri and his colleagues may be to the memory of their great leader, they must deal in their own way with new challenges and new problems. In their efforts to discharge their formidable responsibilities they need the support of a unified nation and of other countries.

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Describing "the extraordinary internal difficulties that Indonesia faces, and the paralysis that governs much of her domestic policies," this author points out that "the social geography of Indonesia and the rivalries of power groups in Djakarta and the provinces have created a massive stalemate against a background of economic decline."

Indonesia: United Against Progress

By BENEDICT R. ANDERSON

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INDONESIA, like other nations of the Third World, has faced profound ambiguities about her personality, her boundaries, her philosophy and her future since independence. Until 1950, the question, "What is an Indonesian?" did not seriously trouble Indonesian nationalists. Indonesians were those who shared the burden of white colonial rule in the Netherlands Indies. The fact of Dutch control defined the arena of conflict (the Dutch East Indies), the future (liberation from the Dutch) and the philosophy (unity against the Dutch). The rapid evaporation of Dutch power in Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty (1950) has since brought the whole idea of "Indonesian-ness" into question.

Indonesia today is in no sense a "natural unity." Racially, the Indonesians are of Malayo-Polynesian stock, but extensive additions of Chinese, Indian, Arab and European blood have made a racial definition of nationhood difficult. Moreover, the basic racial amalgam flows well beyond Indonesia's borders into the Philippines, Malaya, North Borneo and Portuguese Timur. Linguistically, Indonesia is incredibly varied, with about 250 distinct local languages, a "national" language (Indonesian-Malay), which it shares with the rival state of Malaysia, an international language (English) and an "upper crust" language (Dutch), which defines the Indonesian ruling class vis-à-vis the Malayan or Filipino,

but not Indonesia against the rest of the world.

Indonesia is statistically an Islamic nation. But in practice the proportion of those who feel themselves strongly Islamic is probably less than half. The teachings of Islam are followed also by Malaysia and originate in the Near East, so that there is nothing specifically national about Islam. The "ethnic map" of Indonesia's 3000 islands shows an immense diversity in levels of culture. Among Indonesia's more than 105 million people there are stone-age Papuans, decayed Javanese aristocrats, prosperous middle-class Sumatran businessmen, urban intellectuals and bureaucrats, and a hundred other social and economic groups.

Since there was little in Indonesia's social and cultural composition on which to base the idea of "being an Indonesian," two paths presented themselves if the work of national consolidation was to be carried forward after the attainment of independence. One was to concretize an "Indonesian Past," the other was to map an "Indonesian Future" which would as nearly as possible fulfill the hopes and ambitions of Indonesia's inhabitants.

Indonesia's past divides easily into the bitter period of Dutch rule, and the legends of pre-Dutch glory. In both there are ironic ambiguities. Dutch rule was consolidated on Java by the end of the seventeenth century, but in other parts of the archipelago, such as

Atjeh, Tapanuli (North Sumatra) and Bali, it was established only 60 years ago. In those areas, there are still very old men who remember a precolonial society. The deep sense of historical violation which 250 years of Dutch domination and exploitation inspired on Java has little parallel elsewhere.

Indonesia's pre-Dutch greatness is still more disquieting. In the period before the rise of the modern nation state, great political empires were almost everywhere based on a narrow ethnic domination. Thus, Indonesia's glories are the Javanese empires of Modjopahit and Mataram—though Sumatra's dimmer Sriwidjaja and Atjeh should not be forgotten. Since these empires represented the essentially military control of one ethnic subcommunity of contemporary Indonesia over the others, it is exceedingly difficult to base modern national pride on their memory. It has been tried of course, but with less than glittering success.

Because the past offers such uneasy ground for building a national identity, modern Indonesians have tried to cement the nation by appealing to dreams for its future. They have begun to adopt a method first pioneered by the United States when it faced similar problems of national assimilation. The United States solved the problem by defining an American, not in terms of his *historical* roots, but by conformity to a future-oriented American "Way of Life." A strongly nationalist and assimilationist system of education was developed to define and inculcate this national purpose and character in young Americans. Much of the Third World today follows this example.

RIVALRIES AND CONFLICTS

For some years after the war with the Dutch ended (in 1950), Indonesia was carried along by the impetus of her five-year revolutionary struggle. The solidarity born of that struggle was considerable and has by no means yet disappeared. But as the new nation began to face the problems of its future, and the years slipped away, centrifugal forces began increasingly to be felt: rivalries between ethnic groups, party enmities, dif-

ferences in age and experience between those who grew to maturity under the Dutch and those whose formative years were passed under the Japanese (1942–1945) and post-war revolutionary regimes. Ideological conflicts among Communists, Socialists, Nationalists, Muslims and Christians became increasingly serious. Java drained the rich Outer Islands to support her poverty-stricken 70-odd million people and her acquisitive new ruling class. Under the political and ideological lines of division, much older and deeper fissures appeared: clan loyalties, family loyalties, even old-school loyalties. The danger of internal disintegration loomed closer. Nor was Indonesia an "island unto herself." The United States, Britain, Russia and China were far from bashful in their attempts to influence her political and social structures.

Since Indonesia lies within what for the moment is an "American sphere of influence," the United States has played the largest direct role in modern Indonesian history. This has taken a number of forms: economic aid (about \$800 million), loans, guns, machinery, luxury cars, missionaries, teachers, Peace Corps emissaries and a flood of films, books and magazines. On the purely political level there have been the attempt in 1952 to draw Indonesia into a military alliance via the Mutual Security Act; the support given by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Sumatra-Celebes rebellion against the Sukarno government in 1957–1958; and the more general pressure exerted through ambassadors, oil executives and aid missions to persuade the Indonesian ruling class to administer Indonesia along lines favorable to United States political and financial interests.

The impingement of Britain on Indonesia is less direct. London's main interests in the area lie in Malaysia, and she has for many years regarded Djakarta, and especially Sukarno, as a nuisance and a threat. More importantly, in Malaysia she has controlled those parts of the Greater Indonesian racial-linguistic-religious "unit" that did not fall to the Dutch or Americans in the imperial scramble of the last century. These areas form an alternate "pole of attraction"—Malay,

Malay-speaking and Islamic—lying outside Indonesia's boundaries and therefore exerting strong political and psychological pressure on Djakarta. As the sustainer of this entity, Britain has exerted considerable influence on the course of Indonesia's development, especially recently.

Russia has done her best to compete with the Anglo-Saxons, although Indonesia lies far outside her immediate field of interest. She has lent Indonesia over the years something like \$12 billion in military equipment and economic aid, at low rates of interest. A considerable portion of the Indonesian navy and air force has been trained by Russia or by her East European neighbors. Russian literature is to be found in Indonesian bookstores. Until fairly recently there was an appreciable degree of Russian influence on the local Communist party. Generally speaking, however, Russia's role has been to help Indonesia increase her military strength and avoid too great dependence on the United States.

In the long run, China's role in Indonesia is perhaps the most complex and important of all. The local Chinese population of Indonesia is now well over three million. But this three per cent of the population holds inordinate economic power. Practically all urban retail trading and most rural money-lending is in its hands. The great "nationalized" production industries, formally headed by Indonesians, are usually effectively run by second-level Chinese managers. The bulk of the existing Indonesian middle class is formed by this expatriate community. Local Chinese-Indonesian relations have traditionally been strained and, since independence, the rivalry and dislike on both sides have been increasingly felt, especially in Java. There were strong anti-Chinese outbursts in 1946, 1956, 1960, and most recently in the spectacular May 10, 1963, riots in West Java.

The immense economic power of the Chinese and their visible affluence in a period of economic decline have steadily widened the gulf between this minority and the rest of the

nation. The political weakness of the Chinese has in turn led them to look increasingly to Peking for protection against possible pogroms or more subtly organized discrimination. Peking's influence is not only strong within the resident Chinese population, but also within the Indonesian Communist party. Peking can supply the party with funds through the local Chinese community and appears to be the party's most dependable ally against army (and ultimately American) hostility. Moreover, the embourgeoisement of Russian communism has become so embarrassingly clear that only its lavish subsidies maintain Moscow's attenuated influence in the Third World today. In Indonesia, Russia has given more help to the anti-Communist army than it has given to its fraternal party.

Indonesia, then, is not only threatened by internal disintegration through the conflict of different regions, histories, cultures and ideologies, but also by the predatory groupings of the great powers. The Americans have an uncertain bastion in the Indonesian army and sections of the economic bureaucracy, the Chinese in the local Chinese community and the Communist party, the British in areas of Indonesia potentially sympathetic to Kuala Lumpur, and the Russians in the reliance on the armed forces of the Soviet Union for equipment, training and spare parts, as well as the huge debt Indonesia has piled up in Moscow.

"GUIDED DEMOCRACY"

The developments of the last years, beginning with the institution of "Guided Democracy" in 1959, can be understood only within the framework of these varied pressures. The switch from "parliamentary democracy" to the present system developed during a period of widespread regional revolt against an almost paralyzed central government in Djakarta. During 1957-1958, large areas of Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo were virtually autonomous states, some of them cooperating closely with foreign powers. In such circumstances, any government in Djakarta would have felt compelled to use force to preserve the physical unity of the state.¹ If this physi-

¹ Compare for example the situation in the United States in 1861 and Lincoln's predicament.

cal unity could not be secured, no other unity was possible. Accordingly, Djakarta attacked the rebellious regions and by late 1958 had effectively subdued them.

In spite of this success, the central government presided over such a formidable array of conflicting interests, vested and otherwise, that an almost permanent political deadlock continued. President Sukarno constantly faced a dilemma: if Indonesia moved towards a clear definition of her future "internal" political development, large sections of the political public would at once be alienated, possibly presenting the regime with a crisis like the regional rebellions it had just survived. But if such decisive action were not soon taken the growing internal stagnation and disintegration would proceed unchecked. The basic problem of creating a permanent solidarity in Indonesia without threatening any basic internal power group, yet giving Indonesia as a whole a sense of direction and a standard of accomplishment, underlies the whole history of the present Indonesian regime.

The fundamental purpose of Guided Democracy as a state philosophy was therefore two-fold. First, it was designed to soften the virulence of ideological dissensions. In the vague and deliberately contradictory formula known as Manipol-USDEK, backed by an earlier Sukarno conception, the *Pantja Sila*,² to which Indonesians are now compelled to subscribe, the crucial ideological interests of Islam (belief in God), nationalists and army officers (nationalism), socialists and Communists (popular government, international solidarity and social justice) were not only "guaranteed" but deliberately put into im-

mediate juxtaposition. Foreign observers have usually seen this ideology of Guided Democracy primarily as a factitious mythology or an excuse for dictatorship. It is at least as much a desperate attempt to bridge deep, sociologically-rooted contradictions. Subsequent formulations of President Sukarno, such as the slogan NASAKOM (Nationalism — *Agama* (Religion) — Communism) represent the same endeavor—to force conflicting groups into greater solidarity and cooperation.

Second, the authoritarian structure of Guided Democracy is also clearly intended to give the president far greater power to adjust these conflicting interests as he sees fit, if necessary by *diktat*. In countless speeches, Sukarno has stressed the idea that in himself he represents all the major interests of Indonesian society in a complex but dynamic synthesis, and that therefore the enormous powers which now accrue to him³ are not merely legitimate but guarantee justice and progress for Indonesia.

The paradoxes of Guided Democracy now begin to emerge. In spite of Sukarno's virtually autocratic powers, the Indonesian government has never been more helpless. One has only to look at some of the basic issues of domestic politics to see this. Until very recently up to 80 per cent of the Indonesian budget was devoted to military expenditures, partly to finance the crushing of the regional rebellions and later the campaign, ultimately backed by the United States, to make the Dutch yield Western New Guinea. When one remembers that even the heavily militarized United States itself only devotes 50 per cent of its budget to its armed forces, one can get some idea of the crushing burden on Indonesia's finances. Yet any attempt to economize here would deeply antagonize the 400,000-man army which maintains the whole authoritarian structure of Guided Democracy. It is from a dissatisfied army that the president personally has most to fear. Moreover, the powerful army is essential, as we shall see, for Indonesia's ambitions to become the dominant power in Southeast Asia.

Measures taken to halt Indonesia's spiral-

² Manipol-USDEK is an abbreviation for *Manifest Politik* (Political Manifesto), a speech given to inaugurate Guided Democracy on National Independence Day, August 17, 1959, and the acronym of the five political principles of Guided Democracy: the Presidential Constitution of 1945, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and National Individuality. The five principles of *Pantja Sila*, as noted above, are Belief in God, Nationalism, International Solidarity, Popular Government and Social Justice.

³ He is, *inter alia*, Great Leader of the Revolution, President of the Republic of Indonesia for life, Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Father of the Nation, and Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council.

ling inflation (about 200 per cent yearly) were instituted in May, 1963, when large increases in various forms of indirect tax were announced in an attempt to redress the heavy budget deficit. The effects of these increases were felt mostly in the lower bureaucracy, unions, and the small business community, where the Nationalist and Communist parties are strong. Not long afterwards therefore the measures had to be largely withdrawn.

Corruption is widespread in contemporary Indonesia. One might imagine that a strong forward-looking government could, under Guided Democracy, tackle this problem. Unluckily any such effort would mean a major purge of the bureaucracy, the nationalized industries and the army. This would threaten powerful vested interests; in addition it would be cruel and ineffective as long as civil service and military salaries are at their present pitifully low level. But these salaries cannot be raised without enlarging the budget deficit even more, and driving inflation on at a still more giddy pace.

The Government's rather half-hearted land reform program has made very little progress because it is strongly resisted by aristocratic and Muslim landlord groups whom the regime feels it can not afford to alienate if it is to build up national solidarity.

In 1960-1962, a serious attempt was made to unify the school system, to provide a much more uniform national education, and to build a younger generation of totally "Indonesian" men and women. This was strongly opposed by Protestant, Catholic, Muslim and Communist educational groups, who feared that it would jeopardize their private school-systems. As a result the government has been able to do little to forward this program. Finally, foreign aid, which in theory would not only help the government's financial position but would also offer Indonesia technical training, machinery and credits for industrial expansion, reflects similar difficulties. This aid, which after all is not offered out of pure generosity of heart, is highly controversial. Formally or informally, the money and equipment are used primarily to strengthen and

support groups within Indonesia favorable to the attitudes and interests of the donors. This in turn arouses fears and jealousies among less favored or opposition groups. Especially now when Indonesia has virtually no hard currency reserves left, yet desperately needs foreign industrial equipment and consumers' goods, the sources providing dollars and other hard currencies are in a very powerful (and exposed) position.

POLITICAL CONFLICTS

Political parties provide a further indication of Indonesia's internal divisions. When Guided Democracy was inaugurated, heavy pressures were exerted by the army and by the president to "simplify" the very "multi-party system. But even after the banning of all opposition organizations, ten pro-regime parties still survive, including three Muslim, three Nationalist, one National Communist, one Communist, one Protestant and one Catholic. Subsequent attempts to fuse or consolidate this plethora have proved abortive. The president still does not have his "own" party. A National Front was set up in 1960 to coordinate all the legal parties but internal rivalries have made it ineffective except for bringing out crowds to listen to the president's speeches and to harass the Western embassies.

Beginning in June, 1964, a campaign has been started, ostensibly by some of the smaller parties, but probably backed by the army high command, for the creation of a single national party on the lines of the single state parties of Ghana, Guinea and Algeria. From the first, it was clear that the campaign was aimed at the Communist party, far the richest, strongest and best organized of the ten. The Communists have naturally fiercely opposed the plan, for the precondition of any such national party would be the disbanding of all existing parties. The movement has yet to win the blessing of President Sukarno, though it uses the banner of "Sukarnoism" to give glitter to its propaganda. The chances of its being encouraged are slight, however, since the Communists are very important to the president. They not only serve to bal-

ance the army's power, but they give the regime whatever genuine radical spirit it has and are the strongest supporters of its foreign policy. They also have wide and probably growing popular support; they would almost certainly sweep a free election held today, at least on Java. Concerned with national solidarity as he is, Sukarno cannot afford seriously to antagonize them.

Perhaps enough has now been said to indicate the extraordinary internal difficulties that Indonesia faces, and the paralysis that governs much of her domestic politics. Although the government's present nearly monolithic control of mass communications and the blanketing of ideological polemic through the state philosophy, Manipol-USDEK, are being used to prepare for a more coherent national unity, the social geography of Indonesia and the rivalries of power groups in Djakarta and the provinces have created a massive stalemate against a background of economic decline. Economic and social progress can only take place at the expense of one or another of the interest groups on which the present precarious political unity rests.

A LOGICAL PARADOX

Retrospectively then, President Sukarno's increasing stress, since 1955, on Indonesia's *foreign policy* as the dominant task of his regime, seems paradoxically logical. An augury of this development can be seen in the 1955 Bandung Conference, where Indonesia had the excitement and prestige of acting as the first host to an assembly of the Third World. But the impetus was really created in the wake of the 1957-1958 regional crisis, when Indonesia's unity was threatened in an unprecedented way. The campaign for the inclusion of West Irian (formerly Western New Guinea) into Indonesia marked the establishment of foreign policy as the real legitimization of Guided Democracy. This forbidding territory, part of the old Dutch East Indies which had been foolishly withheld in the general transfer of sovereignty from Holland to Indonesia, now proved an ideal focus for this new trend.

There was practically unanimous unfeigned

popular support for the campaign in itself. In confronting the Dutch again, the government was able to revive memories of the revolution, the romanticism of the 1940's, the selflessness of the struggle against colonial rule. The difficulties and disappointments that Indonesia was suffering internally could be accepted with honor as the necessary sacrifice for this great national prize. Moreover, the confrontation satisfied the ambitions of all the powerful organizations: the army was able to justify its huge share of the nation's resources; the radical nationalists and Communists were able to increase the appeal of their main philosophical argument that Indonesia must adopt a consistent radical international stance, since she was being throttled by colonial and imperial powers; the president could present himself in his favorite role of national hero and leader of progressive forces, guiding Indonesia to an honored position among the nations of the world.

STRUGGLE FOR WEST IRIAN

In its intensive military form, the struggle for West Irian lasted from December 19, 1961, to August 15, 1962, when the Dutch finally agreed to yield the area to Indonesia through the face-saving device of an interim United Nations administration. Irian had been won. But since the "quest" for unity has no end in itself, and must be continually proved until the need of proof is no longer felt, it was to be expected that the acquisition of Irian would make little practical difference in the general trend of Indonesia's political development. Before four months had passed, that is, in December, 1962, with the outbreak of Azahari's revolt against the British in Brunei, Indonesia had refound her role as liberator and champion of oppressed Asia against European colonial and neo-colonial stratagems and maneuvers.

The British scheme for Malaysia, a curious compound of cynical manipulation, administrative "tidiness" and misplaced idealism, was a ripe target. It was a plan hatched primarily to permit the federation of Singapore and Malaya into a single state, without creating a

Chinese majority or allowing the strong nearly Communist *Barisan Sosialis* party in Singapore an effective role, and to maintain control of the vitally important naval base, still considered a key point in SEATO's military structure. There was, and is, little real unity between the Dayak populations of North Borneo, the busy Chinese commercial classes and workers of Singapore, and the rural feudalism of inland Malaya.

Of course, Indonesia had not forgotten that in 1957-1958 when she was threatened with a large-scale civil war, Malaya had provided the rebels with arms, supplies, money—and asylum. It was clear, too, that if one of the main goals of Indonesia's developing foreign policy was to become southeast Asia's dominant power, the present ascendancy of Anglo-Saxon influence had to be brought to an end. At the moment, Britain is more vulnerable than the United States. But growing anti-British and anti-American (and in certain circles anti-Chinese) sentiments indicate the probable future course of Indonesia's ambitions, as reflected in her January, 1965, withdrawal from the United Nations.

POWER AND RESPECT

In any case, Indonesians have long since learned the lesson that military power and military action are what command the respect, if not the affection, of the international community. Accordingly, from early 1963 onwards, Indonesia has provided extensive logistic support, political and military training, and even guerrilla units for the anti-British and anti-Malaysia rebels in North Borneo. More recently, in the summer of 1964, she began a series of paratroop landings on mainland Malaya, and through an intelligence network did her best to incite communal conflict between Malays and Chinese within the new Federation. Indonesia clearly feels that with British power rapidly declining in Asia, and the American position drastically undercut by the seemingly inevitable fall of South Vietnam, a power vacuum is developing in southeast Asia which it would be foolish not to utilize before other powers, most notably China, stake their claims.

However, since the ostensible adversary in the present anti-Malaysian confrontation is another Asian power, and one which has been recognized by a fair number of Afro-Asian states, Indonesia has had to develop her earlier stance of simple anticolonialism and anti-imperialism. She has been increasingly led to inject a sharper radicalism into her international position—dividing even the Afro-Asian world into “genuine” independent and progressive forces and “puppet” conservative elements still manipulated by their European or American masters. This was shown most revealingly at the recent Conference of Neutrals in Cairo, where President Sukarno led a group of radicals including Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea's Sekou Touré, against the moderates such as Yugoslavia's Tito and Gamal Abdel Nasser of the U.A.R. Sukarno insisted on political, military and economic opposition to the imperial powers, where the moderates stressed the need for concentration on economic development and consolidation above all, not ruling out amicable relations with the West.

But it should be clear that Sukarno's posture is not simply the casual offshoot of the present anti-Malaysian policy, and its necessary legitimization. Nor is it merely an expression of Sukarno's idiosyncracies. It accords with and grows out of the acute internal problems that Indonesia faces and the course that she is trying to set for herself. These do not permit her at the moment to envision a perspective of placid evolution through systematic economic development. Thus, for many Indonesians, the clue to national unity and consolidation lies, not in technical and economic progress, but in military glory, political expansion and leadership in the liberation of southeast Asia from Western power.

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This specialist evaluates the stability of the Federation of Malaysia and describes the "somber tone" of its first year, pointing out that Malaysian difficulties are partially counterbalanced by continued government stability, prosperity and no evidence of mass Bornean dissatisfaction.

Malaysia's First Year

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AS MALAYSIA marked its first anniversary August 31, 1964, centrifugal forces appeared in the ascendancy. For nearly a year Malaysia, aided by Britain, her principal ally, had fended off repeated guerrilla incursions by Indonesian "volunteers" in the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah. Now an emboldened Indonesia had allegedly made both small-scale naval and airborne landings on peninsular Malaya within the month. Almost simultaneously, two different sets of severe communal riots between the Singapore Chinese and the minority Malays presented an even more dangerous challenge. Internal disintegration by a heightened communalism would presumably mean that an external aggressor would not have to rely on his own efforts to assure Malaysia's demise.

The configuration of external political alignments precipitated during the formative phase of Malaysia in 1962-1963¹ remained substantially the same in its troubled first year. Indonesian policy, as in the pre-Malaysian phase, alternated between intransigent hostility and intervals of diplomatic negotiation with the smaller neighbor President Su-

karno had vowed to "crush." The Republic of the Philippines, although its earlier territorial claim on North Borneo (Sabah) remained unresolved, continued its indefatigable mediatory efforts between its two quarreling Maphilindo partners.² Almost a plethora of third parties stood in the wings, eager to render their good offices: Thailand, the United States, Japan, Cambodia, India and, reportedly, several African states.

Of Malaysia's Commonwealth partners, only the white nations of Britain, Australia and New Zealand stood firm in their support and promised to expand it, if required. The United States, still fearful of alienating Indonesia and thus pushing her further within the Communist bloc's embrace, edged cautiously toward a somewhat less equivocal support of Malaysia's "independence and integrity." Through its visiting spokesman in Djakarta, "President" Anastas Mikoyan, the Soviet Union pledged ampler military support to enable Indonesia to combat "neo-colonialist" Malaysia in June, 1964.

In September, 1963, the Malaysia Day rupture among the chief protagonists had seemed irremediably divisive. Incensed by an allegedly "superficial" United Nations report confirming majority Bornean support for Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines jointly refused to accord diplomatic recognition to the new state. An economic boycott was imposed and the important Indonesian

¹ These were summarized in the writer's earlier article, "The Formation of Malaysia," see *Current History* for February, 1964.

² Maphilindo was the loose, confederal grouping of the Philippines, Indonesia and the then Federation of Malaya, accepted by the three heads of government at the 1963 Manila Conference, prior to the formal proclamation of Malaysia. Its minimal function was to create machinery for periodic consultation on mutual problems.

entrepôt trade with Singapore and Penang was halted, with Djakarta threatening to reorient this trade to the Philippines. Systematic infiltration of Malaysia's Bornean borders from Indonesian Kalimantan ensued, first chiefly by Indonesian-trained radical young Chinese from Sarawak but supported by an indeterminate number of Indonesian "volunteers." Armed units manned mainly by Ghurka soldiers under British command restricted the scale of these operations. A prolonged Indonesian harassment of Malaysia on multiple fronts appeared certain.

Nonetheless, early in 1964, United States Attorney General Robert Kennedy's mission to Southeast Asia signaled the resumption of a series of mediatory efforts. Visiting several regional capitals in late January, Kennedy urged the desirability of a Bornean cease-fire as a precondition for serious negotiation of the Malaysian dispute. At the Kennedy-Sukarno talks in Tokyo, Premier Hayata Ikeda was reported to have asked the Indonesian president to soften his confrontation policy. At the end of January both Indonesia and Malaysia indicated acceptance of a temporary Bornean cease-fire.

Simultaneously, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, traveling the same circuit as Robert Kennedy, succeeded in persuading President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines and Malaysia's Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, to hold conversations in his capital, Phnom-Penh, in February. There they would lay the groundwork for an anticipated later tripartite "summit" with the Indonesian president. Subsequently, the Malaysian and Filipino leaders agreed to resume consular relations. Earlier, under Macapagal's initiative, Sukarno had visited Manila, and both heads of state had then expressed the hope that the Malaysian dis-

pute would soon be peacefully settled, recalling the mid-1963 "Maphilindo spirit of *musjawarah*" (consultation).

MEETINGS AT BANGKOK

This diplomatic momentum was not sustained at the two subsequent Bangkok conferences of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, held in February and March under the auspices of Thailand.³ During the first talks, only the arrangement of certain details of the Bornean cease-fire could be determined. Secretary-General of the U.N. U Thant was requested by the three participants formally to invite Thailand to serve as supervisor of the cease-fire; Thailand accepted this responsibility. The prestige of the international organization was enlisted to bolster if only in a small way an admittedly fragile truce. No mutually satisfactory troop withdrawal agreement proved possible.

Even less progress was made at the March foreign ministers' meeting in Bangkok. Indonesia reiterated its position that withdrawal of its Bornean forces had to be linked to progress toward a political settlement. Malaysia insisted that withdrawal was a necessary precondition of further negotiation. The Filipino representative, Ambassador Salvador Lopez, attempted to break the deadlock by proposing a three-point formula: (1) disengagement of the opposing troops and confinement of their activities to their respective territories; (2) agreement to begin talks on a political settlement; and (3) a summit meeting to be held as soon as possible. Malaysia would assent to a conference of the heads of government only after the Indonesian guerrillas had been completely withdrawn.⁴ The Indonesians also clung to their position. By early April, the never-fully-implemented Bornean cease-fire was inoperative.

In May, 1964, President Macapagal took the initiative in reviving tripartite talks. His representative, Ambassador Lopez, began shuttling between Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta to work out detailed arrangements. These preliminary exchanges nearly floundered on the touchy withdrawal issue, but

³ Although Tunku Abdul Rahman held the posts of both premier and foreign minister, he customarily assigned his able Deputy Premier, Tun Abdul Razak, as the Malaysian representative for the ministerial level of exchanges. At Bangkok, Indonesia was represented by Foreign Minister Subandrio; the Philippines by Acting Foreign Secretary Salvador P. Lopez.

⁴ Malaysian News Bulletin, "Embassy of Malaysia, Washington, D.C., April 1, 1964, p. 3.

eventually agreement was reached on a mid-June Tokyo meeting of the three heads of government. Under Filipino pressure, Malaysia retreated from its earlier demand for complete withdrawal of Indonesian troops and appeared willing to substitute an earnest of its opponent's good intentions. For its part, Indonesia endorsed the principle of withdrawal, indicating it would synchronize its first troop withdrawals with the preparatory meeting of the three foreign ministers as they arranged the conference agenda for their chiefs. The final step would be accomplished when Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand, verified the initial troop departures from northern Borneo. Thus the way would be cleared for the "summit" conference proper. But during this preparatory interval, President Sukarno ominously promised a mass audience in Djakarta that Malaysia would be completely crushed "before the sun rose on January 1."⁵

On the eve of the Tokyo conversations the question of Bornean check-points to verify the initial Indonesian withdrawal proved troublesome. To facilitate a rapid departure of the guerrillas, Malaysia initially favored 35 border check-points; Indonesia favored one, to be located in Indonesian Kalimantan. The Thai government proposed a compromise formula of two pairs of check-points, one on the Sarawak-Indonesian border, the second in Sabah. Actually, as the three foreign ministers met, Thailand con-

firmed merely the token withdrawal of 32 Indonesians; over 150 guerrillas were estimated to remain on Malaysian territory. This haggling recalled the earlier Indonesian-Filipino disputation over the numbers and status of their observers for the United Nations Bornean Mission.

THE TOKYO CONVERSATIONS

Only one new mediatory proposal was placed before the three heads of government. President Macapagal suggested a four-man Afro-Asian conciliation commission to study the dispute and recommend a solution within a stipulated time. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines would each select an Asian or African member; together they would nominate a fourth. The complete withdrawal of the remaining Indonesian troops was to be accomplished by the time the Conciliation Commission rendered its final report to the disputants.

This proposal, never amplified in detail, received cursory attention from the conferees; they consented to a conciliatory body only "in principle." Malaysia insisted that Indonesia complete withdrawal of guerrillas before a foreign ministers meeting determined the terms of reference, composition and procedural arrangements for the Conciliation Commission.⁶ Indonesia linked further troop withdrawals to demonstrated progress toward a political settlement by the Commission. President Sukarno reiterated Indonesia's fundamental objection to Malaysia as a British-inspired creation. A fresh reappraisal of Bornean opinion on membership in Malaysia, free of the alleged weaknesses of the "hasty" United Nations survey in 1963, appeared to Indonesia a necessary precondition of a genuine settlement.

Doubt persisted that either antagonist had expected the Tokyo conversations to produce a long-term settlement. Malaysian participation was attributed partly to Anglo-American pressure for a face-to-face meeting between Abdul Rahman and Sukarno. Both states aspired to maintain an image of reasonableness which might help to win coveted Afro-Asian support for their respective posi-

⁵ In the interval between the Bangkok and Tokyo conferences the Malaysian government issued a remarkable White Paper, purporting to demonstrate that Indonesia had had designs on Malaya since 1945, historically based on its inclusion in the ancient Java-based Majapahit Empire, and citing detailed evidence of Indonesian espionage and conspiratorial activities, especially in Singapore. One of the gravest charges was that Indonesia had planned to retain those Malayan citizens who volunteered in 1962 to aid Indonesia in the "liberation" of West Irian for a later conspiratorial uprising against the Federation government in favor of a pro-Indonesian regime. Such deep-seated suspicions of Indonesian expansionist intentions obviously augured ill for serious diplomatic negotiations between the two states. See *Indonesian Intentions toward Malaya*, Kuala Lumpur, 1964.

⁶ Statement of Deputy Premier Tun Abdul Razak before the Malaysian House of Representatives, July 6, 1964, Malaysia Information Service, Washington, D.C., July 18, 1964.

tions. Such support would become particularly important if the Malaysian dispute were transferred to the United Nations.

With President Sukarno as the articulate spokesman for the "emergent forces" presumably destined to triumph over "obsolescent" Western imperialism, Indonesia was assured a responsive hearing by most Afro-Asian states. A residual anti-British attitude prevalent in many of these states dovetailed neatly with the Indonesian line of "neo-colonialism" against Malaysia.

Early in 1964, the Malaysian government took an important step to offset this Indonesian interpretation. Premier Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore was selected to head a mission that visited 17 African as well as two Asian countries. This "Goodwill Mission" stressed the theme of Malaysia as a fully independent entity whose creation had enabled the three states of Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo to shed their colonial status. Malaysia would assuredly not become a guileless vehicle for British-inspired "encirclement" of Indonesia. In reporting considerable success for his mission, Premier Lee recommended that additional Malaysian embassies should be established in certain African countries and that a trade cultural delegation should be appointed to sustain the friendly reception accorded his mission.⁷ But in the ensuing months, the Afro-Asian world remained a vulnerable front in Malaysia's external relations; preoccupation with defense appropriations was apparently mainly responsible for the Government's failure to expand its overseas representation there.

Following the collapse of the Tokyo talks, Tunku Abdul Rahman departed on a prolonged overseas mission to win fresh support for Malaysia in London, Washington and

Ottawa; his expectations were only partially fulfilled. The final communiqué of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in July, 1964, expressed the pious hope that a peaceful settlement could be found for the "differences between Malaysia and neighboring countries." This did not significantly advance the *status quo ante*. Britain, Australia and New Zealand remained the only Commonwealth members to pledge limited military support for the new state. India indicated a willingness to render mediatory services. Canada later dispatched a military survey mission to Malaysia to study its defense requirements. Reflecting a division of opinion within the Commonwealth, neutralist Ceylon subsequently forbade the landing of British and United States ships and aircraft carrying military aid to Malaysia.

In Washington, the Tunku was accorded a courteous reception, but his hopes for an outright United States denunciation of Indonesia were not realized. At an earlier conference of the ANZUS powers, the United States, Australia and New Zealand had defined the defense of Malaysia as a responsibility of the British Commonwealth "in the first instance." This has consistently been the United States position. The Tunku's two major requests were for either long or short-term credits for certain military purchases and a training program in the United States for Malaysian military personnel. The Johnson administration endorsed a modest military training program, promised to consider "sympathetically" credit sales for military equipment and reiterated United States support for an independent Malaysia. Without notably taking sides, President Lyndon Johnson voiced hope for a peaceful settlement of the Malaysian dispute.⁸ At the same time the Administration opposed a demand by the senate to terminate technical aid to Indonesia and halt further training of Indonesian military personnel. The United States appeared determined to steer its precarious middle course between Malaysia and Indonesia.

Incensed by several Indonesian naval and paratroop landings on the Malaysian main-

⁷ See the two special reports on the Lee Mission by the editor of *The Straits Times*, Lee Siew Yee, *The Straits Budget*, March 4, 1964, pp. 13, 16. Among the important African leaders who reportedly heard the Malaysian case "with sympathy and understanding" were U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella, Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea's President Sekou Touré.

⁸ Joint Communiqué by the President of the United States and Prime Minister of Malaysia, Malaysia Information Service, Washington, D.C., July 24, 1964, p. 3.

land which marred its first anniversary, Malaysia finally placed its dispute with Indonesia before the United Nations Security Council in 1964.⁹ The Indonesian defense was placed in an anticolonial context, with its representative asserting the irrelevance of discussing the narrow legal issue of the use of force against a state whose true independence Indonesia denied. Britain was portrayed as the *bête noire* of the whole controversy. As Indonesia saw it, Whitehall had played a decisive role in crushing the 1962 Brunei revolt primarily directed against the British-inspired Malaysian scheme, and had circumvented the Maphilindo attempt to agree upon a truly Asian Malaysia by frustrating a satisfactory survey of Bornean opinion. Its subsequent so-called "defense" of Malaysian Borneo had in fact involved repeated territorial violations of Indonesian Kalimantan.¹⁰

SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

The Security Council discussions represented an anticipated division of opinion. The British delegate, Sir Patrick Dean, advocated a strong stand against Indonesia's "deliberate" policy of defying the United Nations Charter. Adlai Stevenson, the United States representative, argued that the Security Council had a larger duty than the "angry pointing of a finger" at a violator of the

Charter. Adequate means must be quickly devised, he said, to prevent the spreading of the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute. The Soviet spokesman, Platon D. Morozov, fully supported the Indonesian position, denounced the "so-called" investigation of Bornean opinion by the United Nations in 1963 and demanded the withdrawal of "thousands" of British troops and "colonial" officials from North Borneo. As the Malaysian dispute impinged upon the cold war, it became more intractable.

A resolution sponsored by Morocco and the Ivory Coast deplored all attacks or infiltration in the Indonesian-Malaysia region (without naming an aggressor) and requested the establishment of the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission that had been suggested during the Tokyo talks. This made little headway. Finally, a Norwegian proposal merely to "deplore" Indonesia's paratroop landing of September 2 was supported by nine members of the Security Council but vetoed by the Soviet Union, joined by Czechoslovakia. The Malaysian delegation, claiming it had anticipated a Soviet veto, drew public comfort from the support of two African states for the mild Norwegian resolution. Such evidence of a falling away in President Sukarno's Afro-Asian following might serve, it was hoped, to deter further Indonesian invasion attempts.

INTERNAL POLITICS

Internally, Tunku Abdul Rahman's Alliance government had been strengthened by its sweeping electoral victory in April in mainland Malaya. The intercommunal Alliance party with its three loosely collaborative ethnic components, the United Malays National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress, won 89 out of Malaya's bloc of 104 seats in the federal house. This represented a gain of 15 parliamentary seats and assured the Alliance government an absolute majority. Similar gains were registered in the legislative elections of the 11 Malayan states with the Alliance capturing 240 out of 282 seats compared to the 207 seats it had won in the 1959 elections.¹¹ Only in the relatively underde-

⁹ The initial Indonesian response to Malaysian charges of aggression was that they were "fabrications." In regard to the alleged paratroop landing Indonesia explained that one of its transport planes carrying home Cambodian and North Vietnamese dancers from its independence anniversary celebrations had veered off its navigational course. The head of the special Malaysian delegation to the U.N., Dato Dr. Ismail, acidly replied that the only "delicate feminine touch" was the presence of "two well-armed Chinese Malaysian women included in the party of guides." See transcript of the Malaysian delegation, Permanent U.N. Mission of Malaysia, September 9, 1964. Interestingly, the Philippines indicated a negative reaction to the mainland Malayan landings, reportedly making withdrawal a precondition for further Filipino mediatory efforts.

¹⁰ Statement of Dr. Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister, Permanent U.N. Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, September 9, 1964.

¹¹ *Parliamentary and State Elections, Results and Statistics of Voting*, Government of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, May, 1964, pp. 1, 3. Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah had earlier chosen their federal representatives.

veloped state of Kelantan did its major opposition, the extremely nationalist, conservatively Muslim Pan Malayan Islamic party, retain control. By winning nine federal seats the P.M.I.P. also constituted the principal but numerically insignificant parliamentary opposition to the Alliance.

In Kelantan, the major campaign emphasis centered on whether U.M.N.O. or the P.M.I.P. could best improve the economic position of the indigenous Malay population vis-à-vis the immigrant Chinese and Indians. In other states, particularly in the heavily populated urban centers on the west coast of Malaya, the record of the Alliance government in defending Malaysia against the diverse forms of Indonesian "confrontation" was emphatically the leading campaign theme. Alliance candidates frequently insisted that a vote for one of the small leftist parties was tantamount to a vote for Sukarno.

The principal leftist party which, in the pre-Malaysia period, had led the loose coalition opposing the formation of the new state as a British-inspired creation was the Marxist-oriented Socialist Front with two components: the Labor party, appealing chiefly to the poorer urban Chinese, and its Malay wing, the Party Ra'ayat. The leader of the latter, Ahmad Boestaman, had been detained under the Internal Security Act by the federation government for suspected collaboration with Indonesia. Once Malaysia had become a reality the Socialist Front pressed for a quick end to the hostilities with Indonesia. The party lost heavily in the parliamentary elections, retaining only two out of eight house seats, and its state assembly representation was halved to eight seats. The more conservative People's Progressive party, concentrated chiefly in Perak, won only two federal seats; the United Democratic party, led by a dissident M.C.A. member, one seat. Clearly the Malayan electorate had given the Alliance government an impressive mandate to take strong steps to preserve Malaysian independence.

Yet reservations were voiced regarding the consequences of so sweeping an electoral victory for the Alliance. Would it delay the

development of a genuine parliamentary democracy in Malaysia for at least the next five years? The Government party might not heed criticism from so decimated an opposition. It no longer required the support of its parliamentary allies in Sarawak and Sabah, grouped together in so-called "Grand Alliance," to guarantee the passage of its legislative program. Might not the Alliance government now tend to neglect the rapid social and economic development of the backward Bornean states and thus endanger their full integration within Malaysia? Several Bornean leaders had already expressed concern over the slow progress during the first year toward their goal of universal primary education by 1971. Only the initial planning steps had been taken to incorporate Sarawak and Sabah into an overall national economic plan.

In June, an internal crisis in the Sabah Alliance party required Rahman's intervention. Like its mainland counterpart, the Sabah Alliance comprised a coalition of three ethnic groupings led by the Chief Minister of Sabah, Dato Donald Stephens. These were (1) the mostly Malay United Sabah National Organization, (2) the United Pasok Kadazan Organization led by Stephens, himself part Kadazan, and (3) the predominantly Chinese Sabah National Alliance party. Following their victory in the state assembly elections in May, the Sabah Alliance had quarreled over the assignment of leading government posts. U.S.N.O. attempted to oust Stephens as chief minister and substitute one of their own party leaders; a breakup of the Sabah Alliance appeared imminent. This was averted under the Tunku's aegis by a reallocation of state ministries between U.P.K.O. and U.S.N.O., with Stephens continuing as chief minister. Attention was drawn anew to the precarious nature of the Bornean Alliance groupings, which had been initially formed to support the formation of Malaysia. Their disintegration would portend a more sharply communal tone in Bornean politics and adversely affect national unity.

The single most important aspect of the 1964 parliamentary election might yet prove

to be the decision of Lee Kuan Yew's ruling People's Action party in Singapore to enter mainland politics by contesting seats in nine Malayan constituencies. Shortly after Malaysia Day in September, 1963, the P.A.P. government had abruptly called a general election in Singapore and badly defeated its principal opposition in the legislative assembly, the pro-Communist Barisan Socialist, formed by the P.A.P. faction opposed to the formation of Malaysia. The election eliminated the Singapore branch of U.M.N.O. as an active political force, and guaranteed a strong P.A.P. delegation in the federal house. The P.A.P. leadership had vigorously supported the formation of Malaysia from the outset, was democratic socialist in outlook and was identified with a more dynamic industrialization and public housing program than the Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur. So able a political leader as Lee Kuan Yew would scarcely be content with so narrow a power base as Singapore, which had been allocated only 15 out of the 159 seats in the federal house.

The P.A.P. electoral strategy was apparently planned to demonstrate that the party could effectively compete in urban, predominantly Chinese constituencies, against both the radical Socialist Front and the conservative M.C.A. because of its liberal program and impressive leadership. In the long run, the P.A.P. hoped to replace the M.C.A. in the Alliance and thus assume partial responsibility for Government policy. Predictably, the M.C.A. leadership, recently revived by the party president, Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin, was incensed, and Tunku Abdul Rahman made it clear that U.M.N.O. was

not prepared to drop its longtime partner. P.A.P. ambitions received a serious setback when all but one of its candidates were defeated. Its sole winner was Devan Nair, an outstanding labor leader in Singapore, who would further enhance the prestige of the P.A.P. backbenchers in the House. The P.A.P. could be expected to contest future parliamentary elections.¹²

The exacerbated relations between U.M.N.O. and the P.A.P. provided part of the background for the severe communal riots occurring in Singapore in July and September, 1964.¹³ The Malay minority there had suffered more acutely than the aggressive Chinese majority from the drop-off in economic activity following the Indonesian trade boycott. In July, Premier Lee invited a large number of Malay organizations to meet with him for a discussion of their special problems. Certain U.M.N.O. leaders suspected that Lee was attempting to attract Malay support to advance his federal ambitions and in retaliation formed the Singapore Malay National Action Committee to propagandize Malay grievances. Their most inflammatory charge was that many Malays were being unfairly evicted from their homes to make way for industrial sites.

Open rioting between Malays and Chinese was precipitated by a Muslim religious procession held on July 21, the anniversary of the prophet's birth. As the procession, which included 30 men dressed in black and wearing Malay warrior hats, neared the Geylang section of Singapore, some of the Malays were believed to have provoked incidents with Chinese standing nearby. The latter quickly retaliated. The subsequent formation of goodwill committees encouraged by the government did not prevent a second series of riots in September. The combined casualty

(Continued on page 114)

¹² The internal position of the P.A.P. in Singapore had been strengthened in May by a split in its chief rival, the Barisan Socialist. Barisan Chairman Lee Siew Choh and seven other founder members resigned from the party after their call for a boycott of national registration and conscription had been rejected. Dr. Lee claimed that the so-called "Nantah" group, comprised mostly of Nanyang University intellectuals in their 20's, had won control of over 30 Barisan branches. Their opposition to a boycott appeared only a tactical maneuver, and did not represent a shift to a more moderate leadership.

¹³ For a dispassionate analysis of a complex series of events, see "Communal Violence in Singapore" by Michael Leifer in *Asian Survey*, October, 1964.

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Reviewing the developments in Laos since the signing of the Geneva Protocol in 1962, this specialist concludes that although the Protocol "did not prove to be a permanent settlement of the many dilemmas for United States policy . . . [nonetheless] properly enforced neutralization appears more than ever to be the only way that the United States can carry out its commitment [in Laos]. . . ."

Neutralization Experiment in Laos

By ARTHUR J. DOMMEN

Author of Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization

THE "DE-FUSING" of the Laos crisis of 1961 by an international concord of powers may well be regarded by future historians as one of the major diplomatic achievements of the Kennedy administration, ranking in importance only behind the test ban treaty which postdated it. The Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding regarding Laos, formalized at their Vienna meeting in June, was one of historic importance because it demonstrated that American diplomacy in the age of nuclear stalemate need not remain hemmed in by the time-worn clichés of the cold war and can indeed actively take advantage of the fissures appearing in the Communist world. An entirely new perspective was opened up.

That the attempt made at the Geneva Conference of 1961-1962 to neutralize Laos did not prove to be a permanent settlement of the conflict of interests in that country does not detract from the significance of the basic understanding underlying the conference. Few diplomatic agreements prove to be lasting settlements of complex issues. Since Geneva, both the United States and the Soviet Union have experienced unforeseen difficulties with their allies. In a part of the world where so many dynamic systems are interacting, as in southeast Asia, it was unrealistic to assume that the Geneva Protocol

would be a panacea for the ills that had resulted from Washington's long and painful entanglement in Laos. Less than one year after the Protocol was signed by thirteen governments and the Royal Laotian government on July 23, 1962, United States Ambassador Leonard Unger was freely admitting to correspondents in Vientiane that if the neutralization experiment did not work out, it would be necessary, in his words, "to find something else."

It is clear today that the neutralization of Laos has been vitiated by a combination of circumstances. I shall attempt in this article to explain what these circumstances were and point out what has made it virtually a necessity to resort to "something else."

The original proposal for neutralization of Laos, a backward, sparsely populated country without great material resources of its own, but occupying a strategically located piece of real estate between the borders of Communist China and North Vietnam on the one hand and Western-allied Thailand on the other, came first from Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. The Prince told the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 29, 1960, that the highly-publicized internal strife in Laos had overtones of outside involvement that threatened to escalate into a larger war. He added:

While this situation owes its origin undeniably to foreign interference from the two blocs, it is obvious that to avoid the risk of a show of strength, the only reasonable and valid solution to eliminate this new and dangerous trouble-spot is the neutralization of Laos backed by international guarantees of its unity and territorial integrity.¹

GENEVA PROTOCOL

The agreements reached at Geneva were mainly concerned with providing such international guarantees for a coalition in which all three Laotian factions—left, right, and neutralist—received representation, and with prohibiting the future introduction into Laos of the military supplies and “advisers” that had threatened to escalate the fighting there. Within specified periods of time, the Soviet airlift, which had provided the Communist-oriented Pathet Lao faction with sufficient armament to convert from a guerrilla band to a regular fighting force, came to a halt. On the other side, the United States Special Forces teams who had been assisting the troops of General Phoumi Nosavan were all withdrawn from the country.

In due course, the coalition headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma received pledges of moral support and economic assistance from the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, Australia, Communist China and the lesser powers involved in the Laos affair. Cordial visits were exchanged, including a trip by General Phoumi to Peking and Hanoi, and the contretemps resulting from Souvanna Phouma's declared willingness to have official representatives in his capital of both the Taipei and Peking governments, as well as both Saigon and Hanoi, were smoothed out diplomatically.

About the spring of 1963, however, it became evident that events in Laos were not moving in the direction of orderliness, as had been planned, after all. With no progress registered on the crucial problem of merging the three separate armies into a unified national army, fighting broke out at the end of March between the Pathet Lao troops on the Plain of Jars and neutralist troops under the

command of General Kong Le, the diminutive paratroop captain who had executed the *coup d'état* of August 9, 1960, against the pro-Western government in Vientiane. Kong Le claimed that the Pathet Lao were attempting to subvert his troops (whose ranks had already been heavily infiltrated by disguised Pathet Lao agents before the coalition was formed) and cut him off from Soviet-supplied shipments of food, clothing and ammunition.

Soon after the fighting broke out, Prince Souphanouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit, the two Pathet Lao cabinet ministers, departed abruptly from Vientiane for Pathet Lao headquarters on the Plain of Jars. This had the effect of splitting the hard-wrought government and caused considerable difficulties for Souvanna Phouma, who was bound by the “troika” principle agreed to by the three factions in apportioning cabinet responsibilities. After that, Souphanouvong claimed that all decisions taken in the cabinet without his presence were invalid and not binding. At the same time, in order to prevent Kong Le's small force from being completely annihilated by Pathet Lao troops encadred by North Vietnamese advisers, the United States embassy announced it was supplying arms and ammunition to Kong Le via an airlift of unarmed transport planes chartered by the United States economic aid mission in Vientiane.

The pejorative effect of these various violations of the basic understanding reached at Geneva was compounded by the breakdown at the critical moment of the truce-keeping machinery established by the Conference. This machinery consisted of the International Control Commission (I.C.C.). Not only was there total opposition between the Pole and his Canadian and Indian colleagues in this tripartite body, but there was also disagreement between the Indian and the Canadian over how far the I.C.C. should push its investigations into the responsibility for the renewed fighting. As a result, the Pathet Lao were enabled to obstruct the I.C.C. in fulfilling its mission further. Although the breach of the Protocol by North Vietnam (which admitted it had personnel on the

¹ Quoted in the present author's *Conflict in Laos; The Politics of Neutralization* (New York: Frederick A. Prager, 1964), p. 204.

Plain of Jars but called them "construction workers" and "technical experts") was protested, it was not seriously challenged by the United States, which possessed aerial photographs of convoys of trucks entering Laos from North Vietnam with supplies for the Pathet Lao fighting forces.

The Kennedy administration was by then engaged in the negotiations that were to lead to the test ban treaty and was reluctant to press the Russians too hard on a matter over which they were suspected to exercise a diminishing influence. The fact that Communist violations of the Protocol were allowed to go unchallenged not only encouraged the North Vietnamese to exploit this freedom of action further, but it also served to ease the Soviet Union's relations with North Vietnam at a critical juncture of the Sino-Soviet dispute when the Chinese were already accusing Khrushchev of being ready to sacrifice the "national liberation movements."

In the spring of 1964, after an abortive right-wing *putsch* attempt in Vientiane, the Pathet Lao extended their control in the Plain of Jars region even further, at the expense of the neutralists, and once again flaunted the peace-keeping mission of the I.C.C. All this while, from his retreat, Prince Souphanouvong was playing the role of the aggrieved party, charging intervention by the "U.S. imperialists" and hinting that his brother, Souvanna Phouma, was allowing himself to be used by the United States. The latter's dilemma was sharpened when an American reconnaissance plane was downed by Pathet Lao gunfire in June, 1964. The situation, characterized by *de facto* partition on the ground and mutual trading of provocative accusations, bore many resemblances to the confrontation that had built up in Laos from 1954 to 1960.

As the foregoing brief survey has shown, developments in the months following the signing of the Geneva Protocol produced a trend away from effective neutralization and towards the old state of limited but inexorably increasing foreign involvement. There

are two main reasons why the 1962 Protocol failed to ensure the sort of foolproof neutralization envisaged by Prince Sikanouk.

REASONS FOR FAILURE

First, as the party to the agreement most actively interested in the political evolution of Laos, Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnamese regime had reasons not shared by the larger powers to oppose the neutralization of Laos. Ho was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to reunify his own country, and Laos was so strategically situated as a communication route with South Vietnam that North Vietnam had to preserve freedom of movement through it. It is a mark of Ho's skill in politics that he was able to retain a large autonomy of action in Laos despite the expressed desire of the Soviet Union to see Laos subtracted from the list of the world's "hot spots."

Ho, in fact, proved to be such an adept manipulator in his relations with his two more powerful allies that he was able actually to throw his support to Peking in 1963 without forfeiting Moscow's pledged support to stand by North Vietnam if attacked. Ho's government did not even suffer the penalty for offending Moscow which the Chinese had suffered in 1960—withdrawal of Soviet economic aid and technical assistance. Ho has so far not had to abrogate the Vietnamese Communists' officially declared policy goal of federating a "liberated" Laos with a Communist-dominated Vietnam.²

Second, effective neutralization of Laos could only be ensured if the United States made it unmistakably clear to North Vietnam that it continued to be deadly serious about preserving Laos from outside intervention. The United States had the power available to accomplish this aim, if this power was used wisely.

It was obvious that the North Vietnamese would cease and desist in Laos only if they faced severe penalties for pushing ahead with their subversive activities. Once they found out that they could carry on with impunity, no amount of verbal protest could stop them. The United States faced the fact that the

² The origins of this policy goal are traced in the present author's *Conflict in Laos*, op. cit., p. 71 *et seq.*

established mechanism for confronting North Vietnam with its violation of the Protocol proved itself faulty. It was a hopeless proposition to send the I.C.C. out to scout for Vietnamese in the jungles of Sam Neua. Many of the cadres sent into Laos by North Vietnam were mountain tribesmen who were used to moving back and forth across the border in any case. Moreover, the Pathet Lao proved that they would not hesitate to shoot at trespassers, even I.C.C. trespassers, intruding into "their" territory. In view of these problems, some other mechanism was badly needed to lend executive authority to the provisions of the Protocol.

To begin with, a forum was needed in which North Vietnam could be directly confronted with the evidence of violations which by then consisted not only of individual infiltration through the jungle but of the movement of entire convoys into Laos. The most suitable forum for this purpose naturally was a continuation, in some form or other, of the consultations among the 13 foreign powers represented at Geneva—perhaps by round-table meetings at ambassadorial level in Vientiane.

Once the United States made clear its determination to see the neutralization of Laos maintained, then continued violation of the Protocol would have exposed North Vietnam to the severe penalties which only the United States was in a position to mete out. These penalties might well have taken the form of guerrilla-type actions against North Vietnamese staging areas over the border in North Vietnam. The mere fact of the obliteration of one or two of these installations *directly related* to North Vietnam's effort in Laos by élite crews of the United States Special Forces, without prior publicity, would have served as a credible warning to the Hanoi leadership. The sequence of meetings to discuss specific issues and the subsequent implementation of any penalties could have been repeated many times over.

However, instead of taking the form of a continuing debate after 1962, United States-North Vietnamese relations reverted to the total absence of communication that had

characterized them up to the opening of the Conference. As if following the path of least resistance, Washington once again allowed Laos to become the locale for a covert struggle fed from outside, in which the only persons to suffer were the Laotians who had never wished any part of the struggle. When France and Communist China called for the reconvening of the 14-nation Conference to deal with the crisis of 1964, Washington rebuffed the attempt.

While the powers at large went on paying lip service to the Geneva Protocol as the basis of their relations with Laos, the extremist factions on the ground entrenched themselves further.

PATHET LAO POLICY

There can be little doubt that the biggest obstacle facing the Pathet Lao in their attempt to consolidate control over the approximately two-thirds of the country from which the other two factions are excluded has been their dependence on the Vietnamese, who are regarded by the average Laotian as foreigners to be mistrusted and feared. This obstacle the Pathet Lao have been seeking to overcome by patient grassroots work.

Particularly after mid-1963, reports came in of a second echelon of Pathet Lao leaders being given responsibilities for organizational and administrative work. Radio reports referred to at least nine Pathet Lao provincial governors, and it became clear that the Pathet Lao were constructing an administrative apparatus to operate in some places parallel to the Royal government. In Savannakhet Province, for instance, there is now a Royal governor in Savannakhet on the Mekong and a rival governor sympathetic to the Pathet Lao in the eastern portion of the province.

In the sizable areas of Laos inhabited by tribal minorities, the Pathet Lao have been carrying on educational work in their own schools. In the case of the Meo, this instruction includes for the first time the written form of the Meo language evolved by the Chinese Communists for use in Yunnan Province. According to reports from southern Laos, the Pathet Lao are also engaged in

codifying the language of the important Kha minority for the first time. The action program adopted by the Pathet Lao at their second national congress held in April, 1964, pledges assistance to the tribes "to live on an equal footing."³

All this is aimed, of course, at solidifying the political appeal and control of the Pathet Lao in expectation that general elections in the countryside will give them a majority of seats in the National Assembly and allow them to form a national government whose neutralism will be more to the liking of Hanoi and Peking than is that of Souvanna Phouma. Political parties on the non-Communist side have remained largely élite-type affairs with no real grassroots support. The prime minister himself has been fully occupied with keeping the coalition together, with military affairs, and with trips abroad. His most effective political support at home is the government apparatus. But, as has been pointed out, the Pathet Lao have been much more dynamic in their organizing efforts, which contrast, as one writer has recently pointed out, "with the loose administration in the right-wing areas, where the traditional amalgam of central bureaucracy and village autonomy prevails."⁴

Despite this active attention to the countryside at large, the Pathet Lao have been encountering their share of troubles. Guerilla activities of Meo fighters in the Pathet Lao rear areas and effective strafing and bombing attacks by United States supplied T-28 aircraft have had a particularly drastic effect on Pathet Lao morale and have induced defections to the government side, heretofore unheard of.

U.S. ECONOMIC AID

United States economic aid to neutralist Laos underwent a complete reappraisal after 1962. The loopholes which had previously permitted corruption were plugged up as best they could be plugged, and end-use of project assistance was subjected to closer scrutiny. Furthermore, by creation of an

internationally-supported stabilization fund, the drastic loss of value of the Laotian kip currency was halted.

Another change that took place in United States aid was the scaling down of the top-heavy aid mission in Vientiane. Greater emphasis was placed on work at the village level. By improving roads in relatively secure areas, services were brought into rural areas where the previous aid program had never been able to reach, and the government set about creating what were called "cluster villages" where elementary assistance in the fields of health, agriculture and education was available. The manual labor involved was provided by the villagers themselves, but the villages were not fortified. The reaction of the Pathet Lao was characteristically realistic; the "cluster villages" would not be destroyed, *provided* the Americans kept out of politics there.

The patient United States effort to build up support for the non-Communist side was very nearly upset in April, 1964. Souvanna Phouma had finally met Souphanouvong on the Plain of Jars after a prolonged interchange of telegrams and amid elaborate security precautions. The meeting, which also included General Phoumi, lasted two days and eventually broke up in disagreement about whether the Royal capital of Luang Prabang could be neutralized to the satisfaction of all. Souvanna Phouma threatened to resign over the impasse between his two deputy prime ministers, and returned to Vientiane on the evening of April 18 in a dejected frame of mind.

THE PUTSCH

Trouble had been brewing for some time in the right-wing camp, and the breakdown of the Plain of Jars negotiations provided the signal for what a small circle of ambitious military officers hoped would be a United States-backed scrapping of the coalition and the installation of a frankly right-wing government. The leader of this circle was a 28-year-old general, Siho Lamphouthacoul, who had once been a protégé of General Phoumi and who had recently returned from a six-month sojourn on Taiwan. No doubt in-

³Vietnam News Agency, Hanoi, April 13, 1964.

⁴Eric Pace, in "Laos: Continuing Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1964, p. 71.

fluenced by the rapid United States announcement of support for General Nguyen Khanh's *coup d'état* of January 30 in South Vietnam, Siho decided to move in. He took with him the commander of the Vientiane military region, General Kouprasith Abhay, another ambitious young officer whose connection with the powerful Sananikone family of Vientiane made him a natural rival of General Phoumi, who is from Savannakhet.

Together, the two generals surrounded Souvanna Phouma's house with their troops and announced to the prime minister that they were placing him under arrest. The weary and disgusted Souvanna Phouma took in this scenario with as much aplomb as he could command. Ambassador Unger, who was caught out of town when the *putsch* occurred, hurried back to Vientiane and made it plain to the generals that the United States was not interested in having another right-wing dictatorship on its hands. The generals were constrained to back down.

Predictably, the Pathet Lao took advantage of the attempted *putsch*, namely by inciting defections from the ranks of General Kong Le, who depended on Souvanna Phouma's authority as a neutralist mediator. Using these defections as a smokescreen, the Pathet Lao, again with North Vietnamese support, resumed military action against the neutralist garrison in north-central Laos and this time drove the government's troops completely off the Plain of Jars. Kong Le reestablished his headquarters at Vang Vieng on the road between Vientiane and Luang Prabang.

Communist China and North Vietnam then dropped hints that the Communist powers might refuse to recognize Souvanna Phouma as the legal prime minister because he had lost his status of "neutralist." Thereby they reinforced the arguments that had been propounded by the rightists before they were squelched by the United States, and thus adroitly fanned the flames that were gradually destroying the cohesiveness of the anti-Communist front in Laos.

However, both China and North Vietnam supported the tripartite talks that opened in Paris in September, 1964, and Khrushchev

failed to go through with his threat to resign the co-chairmanship of the Geneva Conference (an action which would have implied a voluntary forfeiting of any remaining Soviet influence on the Laos situation), showing that apparently the Communist powers were still interested in the coalition.

Even North Vietnam continued to maintain correct diplomatic relations with Vientiane, although on the strictly military plane it had made use of in the months following 1962 to transform the Laotian border into a security zone. Apparently fearing United States attack, particularly after American troops were dispatched to Thailand in May, 1962, North Vietnam proceeded then to post fully armed border guards on the jungle trails crossing over from Laos into North Vietnam. It had also improved the state of the key roads leading across the mountains, and "hardened" the tops of the passes with concrete bunkers for antiaircraft guns.

BANGKOK REACTION

What was regarded in Bangkok as only the latest evidence of United States indecisiveness in the face of Communist pressure produced another round of worrying among the Thais over the value of their commitment to the West. The sensitiveness to United States intentions in southeast Asia was plainly reflected in an article written by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman and published in the July, 1964, issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The article made it quite clear that the position of the United States vis-à-vis Communist aggression in Laos had not been settled to

(Continued on page 115)

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Vietnam: The Agonizing Reappraisal

By BERNARD B. FALL

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The military "kill" becomes the primary target—simply because the essential political target is too elusive for us, or worse, because we do not understand its importance. . . . The Communist challenge in Southeast Asia has yet to be faced on its real terrain: that of ideas, policies and down-to-earth effective administration. . . . North Vietnam is likely to be a tough and determined "adversary-by-proxy" in what can in all honesty be called "The Second Indochina War."

The above lines are taken from this writer's *Current History* article of November, 1962, written and researched in the late summer of that year; 15 months before the overthrow of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime (and the murder of the latter) on November 2, 1963.

More than one year later, nothing has happened that would in any way tend to modify that estimate. The disintegration of South Vietnamese society, precipitated by the Diem regime's dictatorial policies but carefully plastered over until its demise, has now come into the open and manifests itself in student riots, government paralysis at most levels and in many areas, Buddhist demonstrations, and war-weariness among many South Vietnamese Army (A.R.V.N.) units. Pro-government successes may still be best measured in "kills"—23,500 for the year 1963¹—rather than in provinces or districts made safe

for unfettered local elections or for effective economic improvement.²

The "Strategic Hamlet" program, launched with great fanfare in March, 1962, and designed (in slavish imitation of a Malayan pattern totally inapplicable to Vietnamese conditions) to protect the villagers and their chiefs from Communist control, was a shambles by the time Diem died, although that truth had been hidden from the outside world, and in part probably from Diem as well. Probably one of the few side benefits of Diem's demise was that it set in motion a reassessment of Vietnam's internal situation and occasioned a series of brutally frank studies (most of which are still unavailable to the public), which showed clearly how badly the situation had deteriorated. Of the 8,500-odd strategic hamlets—now rebaptized "New Life Hamlets"—officially declared to be in existence, less than 1,500 were viable. In a misguided effort to boost their hamlet construction "score," some provincial governors had declared a hamlet "strategic" when it had received a few strands of barbed wire and a few old hunting guns; while others had exerted dire pressure on the population to provide free construction services for jobs that should have been remunerated. The result was that a joint American-Vietnamese report of January, 1964, openly stated that

¹ Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (M.A.-C.V.), *The Observer* [weekly], March 21, 1964. The same source credits 7,500 of those kills to fixed-wing aircraft.

² While this is totally forgotten today, local elections took place in wartorn non-Communist Vietnam in January and June, 1953. The 3,650 elected town councillors were (predictably) anti-French in their majority, a few even were open "neutralists," and one successful candidate—in Saigon—was a Trotskyite Marxist. But it was felt in Saigon that the gain in representativeness was worth the gamble. The by then hopeless military situation prevented further exploitation of that initial gain.

"the war cannot be won unless immediate reforms are made at the village level."³ At year's end, no reforms had been undertaken.

In the urban areas of Vietnam, nine years of total denial of political expression were followed by a typical "decompression" problem. Vietnam's students and Buddhist leaders, hitherto silent, gave the country what could almost be called a case of the political "bends." In their attempt to create a South Vietnamese regime which (having represented them not at all for nine years) would represent them only and in full, they went to an anarchical extreme.

VIETNAM'S BUDDHISTS

It should be obvious by now that in the present state of affairs in South Vietnam, *everything* is Communist-infiltrated. In 1951, Bishop of Saigon Chassaigne had to dissolve the *Sao-Mai* Boy Scout units of the Saigon area, because they were Communist-infiltrated. In the kind of fratricidal war being fought in Vietnam, even family bonds prove little: Buddhist leaders Tam Chau or Tri Quang may have brothers in North Vietnam; but so have Generals Duong Van Minh and Nguyen Khanh. And it was Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu who proudly admitted, three months after her husband had been murdered along with Diem, that he had indeed contacted Vietcong leaders and was undertaking negotiations, allegedly for their surrender.⁴

As for the Buddhists of Vietnam, it would be totally futile to argue in detail with those who hold the view that the Buddhists are the sole channel of Communist infiltration in South Vietnam.⁵ In the case of Vietnam's

"Buddhists,"⁶ persecution was *real*, but it was not new, nor, for that matter, one-sided. The myth of Vietnamese religious tolerance, sedulously built up by the Diem regime and some of its foreign admirers, does not stand serious examination. One of the most compelling reasons for French intervention in Vietnam in 1845-1847 was precisely that the Vietnamese emperors, Thieu-Tri and Tu-Duc, were engaging in wholesale massacres of Vietnamese Catholics. An American Catholic source averred that "in the persecutions of the last century, tiny Vietnam had 100,000 martyrs, far above any single nation's quota [sic] since the early Roman persecutions."⁷ Independent Vietnamese and French sources confirm this. Under the French, the pendulum swung the other way and kept on swinging that way under Diem.

As early as 1952, Vietnamese sources began to complain that French-armed Catholic militia forces, rather than fighting the Communists, preferred to use their weapons to "plunder pagodas, demolish temples, and convert by force the population."⁸ And exactly nine years later, in July, 1961, a Western observer, though sympathetic to the Diem regime, was to report that an A.R.V.N. military operation failed to capture Communist insurgents but, in the process, destroyed rural villages in Tra Vinh province of the Mekong delta:

The following month, after the army had retired leaving thousands of unhappy peasants behind it, Buddhist bonzes petitioned the province chief in Tra Vinh against the shelling of hamlets and pagodas and to demand the release of their imprisoned fellows. Some months later their leader, Superior Bonze Son Vong, appeared on the lists of the central committee of the Viet Cong's National Liberation Front.⁹

PRO-CATHOLIC BIAS

That case, from personal observation, was not unique; and discrimination in favor of Catholics throughout the Diem administration was sufficiently widespread for *Informations Catholiques Internationales* to devote almost a whole issue to it (and to its long-range danger for the Vietnamese Catholic community) *before* the outbreak of the Bud-

³ *The Saigon Post*, January 20, 1964.

⁴ *Le Nouveau Candide*, Paris, February 13, 1964.

⁵ See Marguerite Higgins, "Ugly Americans of Vietnam," in *America* [a Jesuit weekly], October 3, 1964; or *Time*, December 11, 1964.

⁶ "Buddhists" in Vietnam include all the Confucianists, ancestor-worshippers, Cao-Dai and Hoa-Hao sect members who do not explicitly reject Buddha; as do the Catholic, Protestant and Muslim minorities in Vietnam.

⁷ *Catholic Digest*, February, 1962, p. 17.

⁸ Van Thanh, "L'auto-défense des villages: Base de la pacification du Nord-Vietnam," *Orient-Occident*, Paris, November, 1952, p. 19.

⁹ Denis Warner, *The Last Confucian*. London: Penguin Books, 1964, p. 153.


dhist demonstrations in Vietnam.¹⁰ All that did not prevent the departing American ambassador, Frederick E. Nolting, from declaring, as he left Saigon in the summer of 1963, that he had never seen "any evidence" of anti-Buddhist persecution while in Vietnam.

In sum, the religious tensions which rack South Vietnam in 1964–1965 are not new, nor directly ascribable to some particularly evil phenomenon. Rather than being the cause of South Vietnam's internal malaise, Buddhist obstreperousness is a clear symptom of disintegration of the South Vietnamese social fabric. This does not mean, of course, that the Communists do not seek to exploit that situation: they exploit every other South Vietnamese weakness as well, and probably most of all the dissension among the senior military leaders and the absence of some sort of consensus among Saigon's politicians.

MOUNTAIN TRIBAL MINORITIES

Another part of the Diem legacy that might well have contributed to the demise of non-Communist South Vietnam was the problem of the mountain tribal minorities, or *montagnards*. Here also, unwillingness to see that the Diem regime practiced discrimination on a large scale led at least one unabashed but vocal admirer of the past regime to aver that Ngo Dinh Diem was "the man who has both a greater knowledge of and a deeper concern for the [tribal] minorities than any other person in Vietnam."

The actual facts showed otherwise. American scholars in the field, notably Professors Gerald C. Hickey and Frederic Wickert, pointed out as early as 1957 that the *montagnards* were bitterly dissatisfied with the Vietnamese government's policies of forced assimilation of the minorities in the guise of "equality" and with the colonization of the hill areas by lowlanders.¹¹ Hickey and Wickert also pointed out (as I did in my



writings) that a concerted effort was made by the Communists to subvert the *montagnards* by offering them regional autonomy similar to that provided in the Tay-Bac and Viet-Bac "Autonomous Zones" of North Vietnam and that many tribesmen were attracted by these offers. But again, the official myths prevailed and the Diem regime was allowed to forge ahead with its assimilationist policies, although similar experiences nearby, such as with the Nagas in India or the Karens in Burma, resulted in similar failures even in the absence of large-scale Communist support for the autonomy movement.

Again, warnings were disregarded. The program of the "Liberation Front" (N.L.F.-S. V.) of December, 1960, contained specific promises of autonomy. A *montagnard*, Y Bih Aléo, was made a member of the N.L.F.S.V.'s central committee. A captured Vietcong document¹² gave detailed instructions in early 1963 on N.L.F.S.V. operations designed to attract a greater following among the mountain tribesmen. And on August 1, 1964, the latter formed a *Front Unifié de Lutte pour la-Race Opprimée* (F.U.L.R.O.) [United Front for Struggle of the Oppressed

¹⁰ No. 188, Paris, March 15, 1963.

¹¹ Bernard Fall, "Who's Who in Vietnam," *The New Republic*, October 17, 1964.

¹² VCD-22, unclassified translation of captured document, USIS Saigon, 15 pp., n.d. See also the lead article in *Liberation Press*, No. 12, October 25, 1962 [an English-language bulletin published by the NLFSV], by Y Bih Aléo.

Race]; which, significantly, stated that tribesmen are "dying every day under the thrusts of the Vietcong" while [General] "Nguyen-Khanh and his servants are incapable of guaranteeing our life and our freedom and also make use of any pretext to suppress and mistreat us."

It was F.U.L.R.O. which, on September 20, 1964, led to the rebellion of Rhadé (also called Edé) tribesmen against both their United States Special Forces advisers and their A.R.V.N. superiors and to their temporary occupation of parts of the hill area capital of Ban Mé Thuot and its radio transmitter. In their proclamation, the tribesmen again accused both Vietnamese regimes as bent on their destruction, although their appeal also spoke of the "warmaking SEATO bloc" and other favorite Communist shibboleths. When the rebellion was contained a week later through a combination of South Vietnamese force and U.S. Special Forces patience and understanding, it was still unclear (as in the case of the Buddhists) how much of this rebellion had been manufactured by the N.L.F.S.V. and how much was genuine resentment of lowland Vietnamese interference with the tribes.¹³ The tribesmen also addressed an appeal to the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations. In view of the importance of the area they occupy in Vietnam, victory—or even a successful stalemate—in South Vietnam would be as impossible without the cooperation of the *montagnards* as it would be without that of the peasants of the Mekong delta.

Clearly, a heavy legacy was left by the Diem regime to its successors. Its worst shortcomings are precisely *not* in the largely irrelevant conventional military field, but in what it did (or what it allowed to happen) to relations between parts of the Vietnamese

population by its constant playing-off of one group against another: refugees-vs.-indigenous South Vietnamese; *montagnards*-vs.-lowlanders; Buddhists-vs.-Catholics; pro-French-vs.-pro-Americans; the army-vs.-the civilians; the peasantry-vs.-the city dwellers. These wounds, deeply embedded in the society, prove harder to heal than military losses.

LOSS OF CONTROL

This may at times be difficult to understand for people to whom "stability" seems to be the only yardstick of government effectiveness¹⁴—they apparently forget that the world recently has seen several "stable" governments disappear overnight, from Batista's in Cuba to Khrushchev's in Moscow. These same observers would do well to remember that it was the Vietnamese *army* (not the Buddhists or the students) who tried to murder Diem twice before, in November, 1960, and February, 1962, before it finally succeeded in overthrowing his regime in November, 1963. There is perhaps no grimmer evidence of the loss of control which had already overtaken the Diem regime in March to May, 1963 (i.e., *before* the Buddhist clashes), than the map below, based on official documentation,¹⁵ indicating the extent of Communist tax collections throughout South Vietnam. In all but three provinces, the Vietcong was collecting taxes of some kind or another; and in 27 provinces Communist taxation proceeded on a formalized basis, with bond issues, tax tables and proper receipts.


While it is always risky to state a case on the basis of might-have-beens, the realities of the situation on the ground inside South Vietnam, even six months before Diem's overthrow, indicate that an even more brutal collapse of South Vietnam might well have occurred had the regime survived the November, 1963, coup. The A.R.V.N. might have split for good into loyal and disloyal elements, and Ngo Dinh Nhu (as his wife asserted in the above-mentioned article) might have negotiated both his brother and South Vietnam into neutralism; or, failing this, might well have joined the rebels with his own Republican Youth movement trans-

¹³ Howard Sochurek, "American Special Forces in Action in Vietnam," *The National Geographic*, January, 1965.

¹⁴ Joseph Alsop, "King's Log and Stork," *The Washington Post*, December 16, 1964.

¹⁵ U.S. Operations Mission, Saigon, *Resources Control Survey—Vietnam*, June 14, 1963, declassified January 1, 1964. The same survey also indicated that control measures were non-effective or non-existent in 16 provinces; and only six were rated as "acceptably effective."

AREAS TAXED BY VIET-CONG
MARCH-MAY 1963



SOUTH CHINA SEA

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formed into *maquis* forces. Those who might reject such a possibility would do well to ponder the example of the American-trained and American-advised Kong-Lê forces in Laos: overnight they smashed the United States-backed rightwing regime and later joined the Pathet Lao pro-Communist forces in an alliance that lasted just long enough to destroy all erstwhile American hopes for a rightwing Laotian regime.¹⁶ In South Vietnam there are ample amounts of civilian and military candidates for a "Kong-Lê gambit."

Throughout 1964, the situation inside South Vietnam worsened considerably by every yardstick of insurgency measurement, from actual battle casualties to tonnage of rice not falling into Vietcong hands; from the size of the enemy units to the desertion rate of the A.R.V.N. forces; from the reduction of United States advisory forces promised in October, 1963, to the steady increase of American reinforcements until the 25,000-men mark was probably reached by early 1965. The losses of village officials through assassination, which had reached a peak rate of 4,000 a year in 1960-1961, had reached the figure of 429 killed and 482 abducted between January 1 and November 15, 1964; i.e., ran at a rate of about 1,000 a year. The cumulative loss of such officials since the beginning of the insurgency in 1957 in all likelihood is now in excess of 15,000—or almost one per village.¹⁷

FACING THE OPTIONS

That makes the chances of a liquidation of the insurgency through simple military repression, as in the case of the Mau-Mau in Kenya, somewhat dubious. The recognition of this fact is by now almost unanimous. Yet it has brought about two exactly opposite

¹⁶ See Arthur Dommen's recent book, *Conflict in Laos*. New York: Praeger, 1964.

¹⁷ Jack Foisie, in *Los Angeles Times*, November 16, 1964. The same newspaper, over the signature of Ed Meagher, reported on July 26 that "the Vietcong guerrillas have lost the initiative. . . ."

¹⁸ SANE, "Southeast Asia and Vietnam," press release of October 16, 1964 [2 p., mimeog.].

¹⁹ William Beecher, "U.S. Readies Data Could Serve To Justify 'Escalating' War on Reds," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 18, 1964.

* This phase apparently was implemented late in 1964.

viewpoints on how to terminate the Second Indochina War. One side, mostly on the liberal end of the spectrum, urges a rapid disengagement of the United States from the conflict;¹⁸ while the other extreme argues for a heavier involvement, culminating—if need be—in a full-scale Korean-type ground war in North Vietnam.¹⁹ An even more extreme view holds that the Vietnam affair could be transformed into a "golden opportunity" to "solve" the Red Chinese problem as well, possibly by a pan-Asian "crusade" involving Chinese Nationalist, Korean, and Japanese troops, backed up by United States power as needed.

Other "options" or sub-options have cropped up in recent months and have no doubt been entertained at various government levels with varying degrees of success, or have been discussed in the press. In most cases, however, the arguments failed to take into account some of the obvious difficulties inherent in the military aspects of such an escalation; almost none hinted at the price that would be exacted in blood, treasure or worldwide political complications for the implementation of any one of the options offered.

To "play through" the full set of options would be tantamount to attempting to define the total number of color, trim, powerplant and body variations in which a major car model is available: diplomatically, it will eventually make a great difference if an aircraft of American manufacture used to bomb the Ho Chi Minh trails in Laos is (a) of the Laotian, South Vietnamese or American Air Force; b) piloted by a Laotian, a Vietnamese, an American, or a mercenary in the pay of one or all of the three; c) whether it is propeller-driven (authorized under the provisions of the 1954 Geneva cease-fire) or jet-propelled (forbidden under that treaty); and d) whether it carries a normal complement of fragmentation bombs and machine guns; napalm, weedkilling chemicals, or low-yield nuclear weapons.* Hence the series presented below is merely for reference, and does not pretend to be exhaustive.

1. "Walking away." The option of simply

and purely abandoning South Vietnam to its fate is hardly ever openly considered, although several nations have availed themselves of that exit in recent years: Britain walked out of Greece and Palestine; the United States out of mainland China; and the French out of Guinea. In Greece, another power (the United States) stepped into the vacuum; in Palestine, the Israelis survived; in Guinea, the lesson proved to have no major consequences and perhaps did keep the other French-African states in line for a time; and in China it proved disastrous. What would happen in South Vietnam is obvious.

2. *Negotiating "Out."* The liberal view points to several such instances which did not produce major disasters or simply consolidate an already-compromised solution: Lebanon or Laos, for example. The opposite view argues that to negotiate from the basis of an immediate cease-fire in the field would leave the Vietcong in control of about 70 per cent of the Vietnamese countryside and, hence, in ultimate control of all Vietnam. It further argues that such a negotiation would have a snowballing "domino effect" on other countries in the path of Communist subversion. The counter-argument is that in Europe, the fall of Czechoslovakia, Budapest and the building of the Berlin Wall increased the West's determination to withstand Communist pressure.

3. *Negotiating while fighting on.* This is rarely envisaged, although such a situation was faced for more than two years by the United States in Korea, for more than four years by the French in Algeria, and for three years by the British in Cyprus. One respected observer reported the following Vietnamese view from Saigon, expressed in December, 1963:

When General Minh [the then junta leader] tells us that we must fight on until final victory, nobody follows him because everybody knows that [victory] is impossible. But if you tell the Vietnamese that they must fight to restore the

situation before making peace, you will see that they will go along with it.²⁰

Whether this held true 18 months later would be hard to assess. But the Korean precedent tends to show that "negotiation" as a concept did not diminish the combativeness of the Korean troops.

4. *"Diplomatic judo."* Judo is the art of defeating one's enemy by making use of leverage gained from his own body weight. In the case of South Vietnam's adversary-by-proxy, that weight is its justified fear of a conjugation of United States and Red Chinese pressure. That is, any sizeable American action against North Vietnam would no doubt bring about a Red Chinese reaction *à la* Korea; e.g., a preemptive occupation by Chinese forces of North Vietnam.

It is hardly likely that such a possibility is viewed with favor by the older North Vietnamese leadership. It did not fight against the French for 30 years and against the United States for 10 merely to become a Chinese satrapy and a battleground for a Sino-American military contest.²¹

5. *Fight on under the "ground rules."* That covers the present policy, with a variety of "escalatory" variations, involving sealing off South Vietnam's boundaries; the introduction of high-performance weapons; and, ultimately, of United States and other allied ground troops as combatants. The purpose of the exercise would be to gain time until the essential civilian counterinsurgency measures begin to take hold. Such tactics worked successfully in such cases as Malaya and the Philippines. They failed in Algeria (in spite of the real military successes of the French), in Cyprus and in Palestine, among many others. In either case, they bring on extremely long-lasting wars, with a resulting heavy burden on the civilian population: Malaya, 13 years; Algeria, 8 years; Philippines, 6 years; Cyprus, 5 years.

6. *Escalation-by-proxy.* The proxy is double, as it may involve pressure by non-American proxies and on territory not belonging to either of the direct contenders, North and South Vietnam. As shown earlier, the bombing of Communist supply trails or

²⁰ Max Clos, "Le Viet-Nam après Diem," *Le Figaro*, December 24, 1963.

²¹ For a detailed discussion of that point, see Bernard Fall, "Our Choices in Vietnam," *The Reporter*, March 12, 1964.

staging areas and airfields in Laos by Laotian aircraft, with Lao or mercenary pilots, is probably the mildest type of feasible escalation. If directed (as it already has been over the past year) against Communist supply bases held in violation of the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, its legality is almost unquestionable. So, up to a point, would be the technological escalation to higher-performance aircraft. A similar ground escalation is possible: Laotian troops, South Vietnamese troops; and the latter with American "advisers."

7. *Harrassing the "sanctuary."* Here also, geographical and technological variations are almost infinite. Both American airstrikes and naval engagements against North Vietnamese fixed installations and warships have already taken place, but were of a retaliatory kind. Their episodic nature was underlined by Washington, and the explanation apparently accepted by Hanoi. Hanoi, however, charges that incursions by Thai-piloted Laotian-marked aircraft have taken place and at least one Thai pilot (along with an American carrier-based pilot) appears to be alive in North Vietnamese hands.

In actual military effectiveness, the worth of such operations is nil. The North Vietnamese defeated the French while operating jungle supply lines in the face of 200 French combat aircraft. The relative invulnerability of such human-supported supply operations is best evidenced by the fact that "Operation Strangle," a United States Air Force undertaking of huge proportions designed to destroy North Korean and Communist Chinese supply lines in Korea through massive bombing of the road and rail net, proved to be an utter failure: hundreds of thousands of "A-frame" carriers made up for the destroyed transportation system.

A similar American interdiction operation against the Communist supply lines around the dying fortress of Dien Bien Phu was requested by the French in February-May, 1954. Dubbed "Operation Vulture," its effectiveness against human porters in the jungle was greatly doubted by American experts and the operation was cancelled. There

is no doubt that the same conditions which led to the failure of operations "Strangle" and "Vulture" still exist in Vietnam. Primitiveness carries its own kind of invulnerability when matched against sophisticated weapons.

8. *Repayment in kind.* When the situation in South Vietnam proves particularly irritating, there often arises a "spasm-reaction" of wishing to repay in kind the damage inflicted: blow up "their" military depots; kill "their" village chiefs; compel "them" to protect their cities; subvert "their" mountain tribes, and so on.

Here again, the variation goes from the small saboteur group parachuted or infiltrated for a few isolated missions, to the large-scale American "D-Day" force landing from an armada of amphibious craft and paratroop planes in the heart of the Red River delta. The first type of operation has been carried out constantly at least since 1956. The casualty rate is very high and successes, if any, are few and far between.

In view of the countrywide police and intelligence network prevailing in North Vietnam, in typically Communist fashion, even a more massive effort in that direction is likely to encounter difficulties.

And invasion of North Vietnam would almost surely run into most of the problems the French encountered in the same undertaking. In addition, it would have two likely consequences: a) with the gloves off in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese regime would immediately retaliate as best it knows how, and that would be with its fearsome jungle-going ground combat divisions. There are at least 14 such divisions available in North Vietnam, and a defensive operation against

(Continued on page 116)

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As this specialist evaluates the situation in southeast Asia, the "potential" for cooperation will remain only a potential as long as there is no mediation of the region's political conflicts, for those are just as real as the desire for cooperation."

Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia

By BERNARD K. GORDON

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OBJECTIVELY, and largely from an economic standpoint, there is a great potential for greater "cooperation" among the countries of southeast Asia. All are poor and aim at rapid economic development and, with the exception of Indonesia, all have relatively small populations. There are many projects in the fields of agricultural and industrial development that could be more efficiently and cheaply executed if undertaken cooperatively.

Leaders in southeast Asia know all this; each year, at ECAFE meetings,¹ cabinet ministers adopt resolutions urging more intensive cooperation in the area. It is no exaggeration to say that every president and prime minister involved has at some time expressed his support for the concept of "regionalism." But of course little has been done, and for this there are three overriding reasons: (1) political conflict among the nations in the region; (2) the absence of a widespread conviction that cooperation is practicable in the near future; and (3) even among those who do have a practical commitment to the goal, the absence of any consensus on the meaning of "cooperation."

¹ The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

² For a fuller discussion see Bernard K. Gordon, "Problems of Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia," *World Politics*, January, 1964, pp. 222-253.

Historically, leaders and peoples in southeast Asia have known little about their near neighbors, and have cared less. In some cases, as between Burma and Thailand, when there has been a history of mutual awareness, it is actually a history of mutual hostility. In others, where the contacts are more recent, governments have often concluded that they do not like what they have learned, as between Malaysia and the Philippines. Southeast Asia, it is clear, is an area wracked by conflict, but there is space here only to mention a few of its troubles.²

Thailand and Cambodia severed diplomatic relations three years ago, and Cambodia may at any time cut her remaining "economic" ties with South Vietnam. "Political relations" were broken in 1963. A few months before that, Indonesia and Malaysia recalled their ambassadors, accompanied by a mutual sacking of embassies. Simultaneously, the Philippines also broke with Malaysia, having already announced that she was claiming about one-fifth of Malaysia's territory. Since several of these conflicts will continue to bedevil any thinking in the direction of improved regional cooperation, a few will be explored here. In order of importance, both because of the intensity of the conflict and the relative significance of the nations involved, these would seem to be: (1) the In-

donesian "confrontation" against Malaysia; (2) the frigid state of affairs between the Philippines and Malaysia growing out of the North Borneo dispute; and (3) the plateau of hostility between Thailand and Cambodia.

The causes of the first dispute are not altogether obscure, though there is disagreement on which factors weighed most heavily in Indonesian President Sukarno's decision to oppose Malaysia and in his pledge to "crush" her. At least the following are clear. Already resentful of Singapore's role in their economy, many Indonesians have long felt that Malaya, a small nation akin to Indonesia in religion, language and many blood ties, was not true to her own interests so long as she continued to accept the economic dominance of foreign British and resident Chinese capital, and the political control these investments allegedly represent. It must also be remembered that President Sukarno, in committing himself to liberate West New Guinea from the Dutch, succeeded in consolidating his own dominance in the state. But once this campaign was over, in 1963, "some of the various components of the Indonesian ruling group were eager to embrace some new foreign crisis . . . [and] the formation of Malaysia presented them with the occasion."³ Finally, there has been a group of modern Indonesian political theorists who believe that the Borneo territories and Malaya itself should be parts of the Indonesian state. As Sukarno said in 1945, when a majority of the nationalist leaders voted to incorporate Malaya and Borneo into independent Indonesia:

I have on one occasion in my life dreamt of a

Pan-Indonesia, which will include not only Malaya and Papua (New Guinea) but also the Philippines. . . . I myself am convinced that the people of Malaya feel themselves as Indonesians, belonging to Indonesia and as one of us. . . . I still say, despite the danger of my being accused as an imperialist, that Indonesia will not become strong and secure unless the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands.⁴

Some combination of these elements led to President Sukarno's decision to oppose Malaysia, and to the recent landings of Indonesian guerrillas on her territory. Regardless of the motivation, the consequences of his decision mean that no important cooperation among the two states can be expected for years.

THE PHILIPPINE CLAIM

Malaysia's problems with the Philippines are of a different sort. They derive from the Philippine claim to North Borneo, now the Malaysian state of Sabah. Even if some mutually face-saving resolution of the claim is achieved, there will continue to be irritation, because of the belief in both nations that their legitimate interests have been sacrificed. Leading Malaysian officials feel that Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal sacrificed good relations between their two countries in favor of charlatans: President Sukarno and "Nick" Osmena. A lawyer, Osmena represented the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu, on whose behalf the claim to North Borneo initially was made. Reportedly, he let it be known that his clients' claim could be satisfied by cash: estimates run between \$20 and \$40 million. Then, when President Macapagal announced a few months later that his government had succeeded to the Sultan's claim, and was going to press the claim as a matter of sovereignty and national security, Malayan officials were perhaps understandably upset and even startled.

The Philippine position is that she has a valid legal claim, that this has nothing to do with the previously commercial aspects of the case, and that the best solution is resort to the International Court of Justice. The problem is aggravated, however, by President Macapagal's efforts to improve relations between his country and Indonesia. That effort came precisely when Malaysia was beginning to

³ Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives," *Asian Survey*, 1964, p. 908. Hindley also writes that "with a foreign crisis, the various balanced pieces of the governing coalition can stay together with a common goal; while if domestic problems . . . were tackled there would be strong clashes of interest within the coalition. Sukarno might then have to choose between the PKI and the Army. Whichever choice he made would at least severely limit his present preponderance. . . ."

⁴ "The Territory of the Indonesian State," *Background to Indonesia's Policy Towards Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, 1964), pp. 20-21. Also see Bernard K. Gordon, "The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism," *Pacific Affairs*, Winter, 1964.

feel the effects of President Sukarno's confrontation; to Malaysian leaders it appears that this Philippine policy was a cynical attempt to pressure them by cooperation with their major enemy. Whatever the outcome, it is clear that this dispute has eroded a large portion of the mutual trust previously developed between Manila and Kuala Lumpur, which will not quickly be rebuilt.

Thailand and Cambodia, on the other hand, never enjoyed any mutual trust. While there are few material issues dividing them today, a wealth of historical enmity embitters their every contact. On top of this, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia has long suspected Thai involvement in attempts to overthrow him. This has led him to launch venomous attacks on all Thai leaders: when Thailand's Premier, Marshal Sarit, died late in 1963, Prince Sihanouk decreed "national rejoicing." And Thai leaders, anxious about Communist gains in Laos and Vietnam, believe that Sihanouk will turn Cambodia over to the Communists without a struggle. They further imply that he is no longer in full possession of his senses. Against this background of personal bitterness, it is difficult to envisage any improvement in relations between the two countries as long as the present leaders rule in Cambodia and Thailand.

IS REGIONALISM PRACTICAL?

These negative aspects of "regional cooperation," important in themselves, also contribute to a disbelief among other leaders that regionalism can be considered as a serious matter of practical politics. That wariness is compounded by a calculation that the prospects, particularly for economic cooperation, appear too dim to warrant steady attention. But there is a contradiction here; remarkably, a number of leaders continue to devote time

and thinking to this concept. They are convinced that certain cooperative steps must be taken. They also concentrate on the potential for economic cooperation, but when they survey the economic environment, it is the *incentives* that catch their eye. This contradiction may be understood if we consider wider environmental factors.

There is now a worldwide interest in the subject of regional "cooperation" or "integration." Seemingly under the impetus of the European experiment in economic cooperation, leaders in other areas have been encouraged to think more precisely about the possibility for their own region. In Central and South America, planning for economic integration is already well along, and the same patterns of thought have been influential in the Middle East, Africa and, of course, southeast Asia. In Asia, three factors give rise to this development. First, nations in Asia have had very little to do with one another in modern times; with independence, many leaders have felt that the artificial barriers imposed by the Western interlude would and should come down, for Asians would benefit by intensive contact within their own region. Initially, the attention of many who thought in these terms was drawn to the question of intraregional trade, and it was quickly clear that Asia traded with itself very little indeed.

In 1961, for example, Indonesia reported imports of almost \$800 million, but only \$317.5 million represented imports from *all* of Asia, and even of that figure almost one-half — \$142.3 million — represented imports from Japan alone.⁵ Southeast Asia (excluding Singapore trans-shipments) in particular provided a negligible proportion of Indonesia's imports.⁶ Similar statistics were noted by economists from Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines, when they began to study their mutual trade. The Philippines found that in recent years Malaya occupied twelfth place in terms of the value of Philippines imports, and was in twenty-first place as an export market. Thailand ranked even lower: twenty-third in imports, and twenty-sixth in value of exports.⁷ Trends among these three are partly represented in the following table:

⁵ ECAFE, "Intra-Regional Trade Statistics," December 27, 1963 [mimeo.], Table 9.

⁶ The only exception was a sizeable level of imports from Burma, but that was almost exclusively in rice, and President Sukarno has promised to end rice imports.

⁷ Association of Southeast Asia, Second Meeting of the Joint Committee of Economic Experts, "Annual Report on the Economies of the ASA Countries, 1961-62," Manila, November 21-24, 1962 [mimeo.].

PHILIPPINES TRADE BY VALUE [MILLIONS OF \$U.S.]⁸

Country	Exports			Imports		
	'57	'59	'61	'57	'59	'61
Malaya & Singapore	0.5	0.5	0.8	16.4	5.8	7.3
Thailand	0.3	0.2	0.2	6.6	0.1	16.9
ECAFE Region	92.1	132.2	138.7	144.0	154.5	167.9
World	431.7	529.5	499.5	614.6	509.1	611.3

Thus, once an examination was made of the level and tendencies in intra-Asian trade, the conclusion was inescapable that it was pitifully small, *and declining*. Professor Hiroshi Kitamura, a foremost authority, writes that "the developing ECAFE region's intra-regional exports as a proportion of total exports declined from 26.2 per cent in 1952-54 to 22.5 per cent in 1960-62. . . ." He concludes that "likely future trends . . . do not seem to encourage expansion of intra-regional trade."⁹

But a sharp disagreement enters here, because some specialists insist that trade should be a major focus of southeast Asian states in their efforts to intensify intraregional contact. Leaders in ECAFE continue to stress "Trade Promotion" meetings, and in the early stages of the Association of Southeast Asia, Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines also placed a good deal of emphasis on drafting an "ASA Trade Treaty." But these efforts appear destined to produce very little change, because the development programs of each of the countries will continue to focus trade on the already developed world.¹⁰ The capital

goods necessary for industrial development come from Europe, America and Japan, and they are also the essential hard-currency markets for Asia's commodities. This pattern leaves little room for caring about the markets or products of one's neighbors.

WORLDWIDE COOPERATION

But if trade prospects seem gloomy, there is still the second incentive, worldwide interest in cooperation, and the European effort impresses many of Asia's leaders. Not only does it suggest that "regionalism" can work, it also tends to alarm them. For as Europe, and perhaps other regions, achieve increasing economic solidarity, Asia's export-import price squeeze may be intensified. A southeast Asian nation, almost entirely dependent on one or a few commodities, finds that the prices paid for these exports continue to decline, while the price of the necessary capital imports regularly increases. Moreover, these states face the rest of the world largely on a nation-by-nation basis. Thus their interest is drawn to such devices as commodity-pricing agreements, by which they might stabilize prices for such things as rubber and tin.

NEED FOR MASS MARKET

The third incentive for cooperation lies in the fact that in southeast Asia only Indonesia can be regarded as a potentially mass-market economy, and many industries regarded as essential to national development seem to require a truly large population base. Aluminum may be a good example. In the developed world, because of its many uses and low cost, aluminum competes fiercely against plastics and ceramics, and other metals. The pattern for developing countries is already

⁸ Adapted from ECAFE, "Intra-Regional Trade Statistics," *op. cit.* Two warnings have to be made when reading these figures: first, a portion of Malaya-Singapore "imports" means trans-shipment from Singapore; second, when Philippine imports from Thailand appear large they are dominated by rice. These are unpredictable and are seen in the Philippines as a stop-gap measure. On the other hand, there is a rising level of Philippine rubber imports from Malaysia, reflecting a growth of the Philippine rubber products industry.

⁹ In ECAFE, "Approaches to Regional Harmonization of National Development Plans in Asia and the Far East," September 25, 1964 [mimeo.], pp. 9, 13.

¹⁰ Thus trade treaties, or other forms of orthodox measures designed to increase trade among nations, do not in southeast Asia attack a real problem, because the low level of intra-Asian trade is not a result of "artificial" barriers such as tariffs. It is the consequence of the national economic development programs.

similar: in India by 1966 aluminum consumption will have tripled in ten years; in Taiwan it has doubled in only three years; and in Japan "the projected consumption of 262,000 tons in 1965 was already exceeded in 1961."¹¹

In southeast Asia, there will also be considerably increased demand for aluminum, and authorities believe that this field is a "natural" for cooperation. First, there is plenty of bauxite in southeast Asia; second, a very heavy capital investment is required to make aluminum from alumina; and third, "the extent of the market is an important factor in the economics of this industry."¹² Generally, the factors that most affect cost, such as the price of electric power, suggest strong incentives for cooperation among countries which do not have by themselves all of the necessary ingredients: "any step in the direction of co-operation for a larger market is welcome."¹³

Another field that would seem to call for cooperation is fertilizer production. The ECAFE region now accounts only for about 10 per cent (3.5 million tons) of world consumption, and one study estimated that by 1980, using the same acreage, 20 million tons would be needed annually. Recognizing this problem, all the states in the region plan to increase vastly their production and use of fertilizers, but this requires a massive investment of technology, machinery, raw materials and capital. Indonesia, for example, has programmed more than \$225 million for this purpose, and \$5 billion will be required to satisfy the needs of the region.

Would cooperation aid in the realization of these goals? Without going into details here, it seems clear that agreements on specialization, for producing the plant and machinery involved, as well as in the production of different types of fertilizers, would be of great benefit to the countries concerned. It would bring considerable savings in foreign

exchange, and facilitate efforts to explore the raw materials from which chemical fertilizers are produced. These resources are unevenly distributed in southeast Asia, and considerable geological research and exploration will be necessary. These seem an ideal opportunity for joint efforts.

Similar examples of development goals that would benefit greatly by cooperation could be cited: in rubber, jute, rice, paper and pulp, to say nothing of iron and steel. Each provides an instance where cooperation or co-ordination seems called for, either because of economies of scale, or because of the sheer amount of the investment required or because several of the resources for a given industry are located in different countries. But awareness of these incentives is clouded over, in the minds of many leaders, by a disbelief that these goals are practical. We cannot resolve this contradiction: it is part of the contemporary environment.

Part of the reason for this disbelief is that the problems themselves are so enormous. Officials are hard pressed enough in national efforts at development without having to ponder methods of working with a neighboring, equally poor, country. There is, after all, very little precedent for thinking *across* national lines, and little encouragement to do so. For example, the foreign aid programs of the United States and other countries, and the World Bank, are designed to listen to the requests of various national governments, one at a time.

NO CLEAR CONSENSUS

The third impediment to cooperation, after political conflict, and the sheer size and novelty of the idea, is the lack of consensus on its meaning. Experience in the one indigenous effort at regional cooperation so far attempted by Asian nations, the Association of Southeast Asia, provides illustrations. ASA was established in 1961 by Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaya, for "economic and cultural" cooperation among them. The first projects ASA named ranged from possibilities for a joint "ASA Airline" and an "ASA Trade Treaty," to steps to encourage tourism by

¹¹ Kitamura, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 72. For example, in bauxite mining in Ghana it is estimated that labor input declines by 40 per cent as production increases from 400,000 tons to 1,000,000 tons. Similar economies exist in later stages of the aluminum-producing process.

¹³ *Ibid.*

"easing frontier formalities." Many other ideas were also expressed, some very large-scale, some seemingly minute.

Then, in late 1962, the "experts" met—specialists in transport and trade, higher education, agricultural and industrial development, and so on. What happened is fascinating and instructive: they soon learned that with the best will in the world, "cooperation" does not come about simply with the flourish of foreign ministers' pens, and their signatures on a document. It was learned, for example, that Malaya did not really own its "national" airline; that Thai Airways was obligated to Scandinavian Airlines and could not act independently; that Philippines Airlines had little to contribute. In shipping, it was found that the three countries possessed hardly any ships. In the field of "educational exchanges," officials learned that the three countries had such different school systems that no progress was possible without first undertaking an exhaustive examination of high school programs, with a view to harmonizing college entrance qualifications. In trade cooperation, it soon became apparent that the three countries had very little to sell to each other and, even if they had, their business communities knew next to nothing about the neighboring markets.

All of this led to a "shaking down" process in ASA. Grandiose goals, such as the joint airline scheme, were scrapped. Goals which still seemed practicable were specifically identified, and arrangements were made to subject them to the kind of exhaustive study required before negotiations are meaningful. A limited number of cooperative steps were undertaken, but none of these is of major significance.

The net result of this experience, however, was far from negative.¹⁴ For the first time, leaders in southeast Asia had come together *under their own initiative* and had begun the difficult task of finding out whether the pleasantries of "regional cooperation" might

have meaning. Even more important, ASA established a regular pattern of communication among knowledgeable specialists—leaders in their own countries. That was no mean achievement.

More widely, this effort in subregional cooperation taught three lessons, and these can have significance elsewhere in Asia. First, it was learned that some goals of cooperation, admittedly attractive, cannot be achieved now. This lesson is extremely important, because until it is learned, energies continue to be drawn from more practical goals which can be achieved. Second, leading officials were forced to acquaint themselves with details of their own nation's procedures, in a variety of fields, before they could negotiate realistically about "cooperation." Finally, participants in ASA came to realize that its best works are likely to come from efforts in technological cooperation, particularly in joint research ventures that will benefit the development programs of each member. The "Trade Treaty," many realize, will be far less important than the ASA Fund they have established—because the Fund provides \$3 million with which to sponsor research on problems of rubber, fisheries, land use and so on.

Admittedly, the tangible, material results of ASA are not much to crow about. But the intangibles are of importance, particularly because they mean an intensification of cross-national communications, and because they have led to a discarding of grandiose goals in favor of practical efforts that can be implemented. Yet we must place this effort in perspective: on September 16, 1963, when Ma-

(Continued on page 115)

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¹⁴ These judgments on ASA derive from the author's current research on that effort, and other aspects of international relations in southeast Asia, and from his several periods of field research on the region in 1962-1965.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

United Nations Resolution on Cambodia

On June 4, 1964, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted the following resolution on the Cambodian-Vietnamese dispute brought before the Council by Cambodia:

The Security Council, considering the complaint by the Royal Government of Cambodia in document S-5697.

Noting the statements made in the Council in regard to this complaint.

Noting with regret the incidents which have occurred on Cambodian territory and the existing situation on the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier.

Taking note of the apologies and regrets tendered to the Royal Government of Cambodia in regard to these incidents and the loss of life they have entailed.

Noting also the desire of the Governments of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam to succeed in restoring their relations to a peaceful and normal state,

1. Deplores the incidents caused by the penetration of units of the Army of the Re-

public of Vietnam into Cambodian territory;

2. Requests that just and fair compensation should be offered to the Royal Government of Cambodia;

3. Invites those responsible to take all appropriate measures to prevent any further violation of the Cambodian frontier;

4. Requests all states and authorities and in particular the members of the Geneva conference to recognize and respect Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity;

5. Decides to send three of its members to the two countries and to the places where the most recent incidents have occurred in order to consider such measures as may prevent any recurrence of such incidents. They will report to the Security Council within 45 days. (For report, see "The Month in Review," *Current History*, September, 1964, page 182.)

Peking Statement on Nuclear Test

On October 16, 1964, an atomic explosion in China indicated that the Communist Chinese would soon join the United States, Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. as nuclear powers. An official statement of the Chinese People's Republic, released by the Chinese Communist press agency Hsinhua, hailed the success of the nuclear blast. The statement follows in full:

China exploded an atom bomb at 1500 hours [3 P.M.—3 A.M., New York time] on Oct. 16, 1964, and thereby conducted successfully its first nuclear test.

This is a major achievement of the Chinese people in their struggle to increase their na-

tional defense capability and oppose the United States imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats.

To defend oneself is the inalienable right of every sovereign state. And to safeguard world peace is the common task of all peace-

loving countries.

China cannot remain idle and do nothing in the face of the ever-increasing nuclear threat posed by the United States. China is forced to conduct nuclear tests and develop nuclear weapons.

The Chinese government has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Should this have been realized, China need not have developed the nuclear weapon. But this position of ours has met the stubborn resistance of the United States imperialists.

The Chinese government pointed out long ago that the treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests signed by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union in Moscow in July, 1963, was a big fraud to fool the people of the world, that it tried to consolidate the nuclear monopoly held by the three nuclear powers and tie up the hands and feet of all peace-loving countries, and that it not only did not decrease but [actually served to increase the threat of] imperialism against the people of China and of the whole world.

The United States government declared undisguisedly even then that the conclusion of such a treaty does not at all mean that the United States would not conduct underground tests, or would not use, manufacture, stockpile, export or proliferate nuclear weapons. The facts of the past year and more fully prove this point.

During the past year and more, the United States has not stopped manufacturing various nuclear weapons on the basis of the nuclear tests which it had already conducted. Furthermore, seeking for ever greater perfection, the United States has, during this same period, conducted several dozen underground nuclear tests, and thereby perfecting the nuclear weapons it manufactures. In stationing nuclear submarines in Japan, the United States is posing a direct threat to the Japanese people, the Chinese people and the peoples of all other Asian countries.

The United States is now putting nuclear weapons into the hands of the West German revanchists through the so-called multilateral nuclear force and thereby threatens the se-

curity of the German Democratic Republic and the other East European Socialist countries.

United States submarines carrying Polaris missiles with nuclear warheads are prowling the Taiwan Strait, the Tonkin Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea, the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, threatening everywhere peace-loving countries and all peoples who are fighting against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Under such circumstances, how can it be considered that the United States nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat against the people of the world no longer exist just because of the false impression created by the temporary halting of atmospheric tests by the United States?

The atom bomb is a paper tiger. This famous saying by Chairman Mao Tse-tung is known to all. This was our view in the past and this is still our view at present. China is developing nuclear weapons not because we believe in the omnipotence of nuclear weapons and that China plans to use nuclear weapons. The truth is exactly to the contrary. In developing nuclear weapons, China's aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The Chinese government is loyal to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. We believe in the people. It is the people who decide the outcome of a war, and not any weapon. The destiny of China is decided by the Chinese people, and the destiny of the world by the peoples of the world, and not by the nuclear weapon. The development of nuclear weapons by China is for defense and for protecting the Chinese people from the danger of the United States' launching a nuclear war.

The Chinese government hereby solemnly declares that China will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The Chinese people firmly support the struggles for liberation waged by all oppressed

(Continued on page 113)

BOOK REVIEWS

ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

SOUTHEAST ASIA: ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. BY JOHN F. CADY. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 657 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$10.75.)

Too frequently the image of Southeast Asia (apart from the contemporary focus on South Vietnam) is that of a pie-shaped piece of real estate in which the great cultural and historical streams of India and China meet and meld with a fascinating variety of results. This is true enough as far as it goes, but Professor Cady has now performed invaluable service by demonstrating that Southeast Asia has historical and cultural validity in its own right and that the outside influences have added enrichment rather than having been its source.

In setting the record straight on the intrinsic values of Southeast Asia, Dr. Cady has given us a volume which lies between the monumental work of D. G. E. Hall and the very useful smaller work of Brian Harrison.

John F. Melby
University of Pennsylvania

THE RISE AND FALL OF WESTERN COLONIALISM. BY STEWART C. EASTON. (New York: Praeger, 1964. 402 pages, bibliography and index, \$7.50, paper \$2.95.)

This is a historian's compilation, in the form of an extensive survey, of the institutional political developments which have accompanied "Colonialism"—from the nineteenth century to the present period of national independence. Part I, "The Acquisition of Colonies," encompasses developments during the nineteenth century, including U.S. imperialist ventures; Part II discusses briefly "The Impetus of Two World Wars"; and Part III (nearly 200

pages) concentrates on "The Prolonged Struggle for Independence."

The great merit of this volume is its global scope. Thus it may serve as a reference work for an outline of what happened in Malaysia or Tahiti, or as the basis for an introductory survey course on colonialism. Except for the author's view that the surge to independence came as a result of changing world public opinion and of the efforts of nationalist leaders, and excepting his francophilia, the book is almost free from interpretation and judgment.

Walter A. E. Skurnik
Pennsylvania Military College

FROM COLONIALISM TO COMMUNISM: A CASE HISTORY OF NORTH VIETNAM. BY HOANG VAN CHI, with an Introduction by P. J. Honey. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. 252 pages and index, \$6.50.)

Mr. Hoang, who participated in the Vietminh Resistance and served the North Vietnamese regime in various managerial posts until 1955, presents a succinct and useful summary of events and steps that turned North Vietnam into a Communist state. The second half of the book is devoted to the analysis of thought reform and land reform.

Chong-Sik Lee
University of Pennsylvania

BRITAIN AND INDIA: REQUIEM FOR EMPIRE. BY MAURICE AND TAYA ZINKIN. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 186 pages and index, \$5.00.)

In twenty very short chapters, the authors examine the origins of British rule in India ("the consequences of absentmindedness") and the impact which the Indian empire later had on the formulation of British foreign and defense policies. In the contemporary context, Commonwealth re-

lations between Britain and India are explored, and the authors hold that despite frictions a community of outlook has continued to grow between the two countries.

MUSLIM CIVILIZATION IN INDIA.

By S. M. IKRAM. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 296 pages, glossary, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

This very readable account is an abridgment of the author's *History of Muslim Civilization in India and Pakistan (712-1858)*. Within the framework provided by the dynasties of the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal empire, and with due attention to the outstanding individuals who shaped this history, the author describes the major developments in religion, education and the arts in the evolution of Indo-Muslim civilization.

Donald E. Smith
University of Pennsylvania

SOUTHEAST ASIA: ILLUSION AND REALITY IN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. By LENNOX A. MILLS. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1964. 365 pages and index, \$6.50.)

A noted scholar on Southeast Asia examines the theory and practice of government in various Southeast Asian countries. He traces their problems with China, communism, neighboring countries, and economic development. Seven of the thirteen chapters deal with economic questions. Professor Mills' study provides a sober and useful introduction to this troubled region.

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES: PROBLEMS OF PARTNERSHIP. By GEORGE E. TAYLOR. (New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. 311 pages and index, \$6.95.)

Focusing on present and future relations between the United States and the Philippines, Professor Taylor of the University of Washington examines the historical, socio-economic, and political forces in the Philippines to "clarify the alternatives that

are open to the United States." This lucid and penetrating book should be read by all those concerned with American foreign policy in southeast Asia.

Chong-Sik Lee

ON POLITICS

THE CAPTIVE PRESS IN THE THIRD REICH. By ORON J. HALE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 353 pages, illustrations and index, \$6.50.)

This is the story of how Nazi publicists, fumbling sporadically on the edge of bankruptcy until the early 1930's, used monopoly measures, intimidation, confiscation and outright theft to make themselves masters of the German press; and of how, within the publishing business, great trusts and fortunes were amassed for the benefit of the Party and a few of the faithful. Independent publishers, non-political, or Aryan, were taken over, forced to sell out, pressed into collaboration and eventually extinction. With editors and journalists first purged, then regimented, press and publishers became subservient instruments in indoctrinating the German people with the views and principles of National Socialism. As a result, millions of Germans gave up reading newspapers. Only the outbreak of war, with the thirst for news it generated, revived the sales of the captive press. But it was never much fun being either a reader or a writer in this regimented world of barren conformity. Professor Hale has provided a wealth of information about a characteristic aspect of totalitarian dictatorship.

Eugen Weber
University of California, Los Angeles

COMMUNISM AND COLONIALISM. By WALTER KOLARZ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. 147 pages, index, \$4.95.)

Before his death in 1962, Walter Kolarz was well-known for his astute analyses of Soviet affairs. This book—his last—deals with the nationality problem in the Soviet

Union, in terms both of domestic dilemmas and international consequences. The essays are refreshing, stimulating and thoughtful.
A.Z.R.

THE RISE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEMITISM IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA. BY PETER G. J. PULZER. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. 364 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, no indicated price.)

Irritatingly insistent on remaining themselves, craftily assimilated, harbingers of change, unadaptable traditionalists, exploiters of the poor, competitors of the middle groups, brash challengers of the rich (or, perhaps, their catspaws), corrupters of the blood, symbols of cosmopolitanism, of liberalism, of capitalist oppression, of Marxist revolution, of ghettos, of emancipation, of intellectualism and sweated labor, ubiquitous resident aliens, recurrent scapegoats, the Jews have been promoted from anomaly to catastrophe—their history (they were the first historical people) the very essence of mankind's but with a characteristic touch of exaggeration:

(Continued on page 116)

PEKING STATEMENT

(Continued from page 110)

nations and the people of the world. We are convinced that, by relying on their own struggles and also through mutual aid, the peoples of the world will certainly win victory.

The mastering of the nuclear weapon by China is a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world in their struggles and a great contribution to the cause of defending world peace. On the question of nuclear weapons, China will commit neither the error of adventurism nor the error of capitulationism. The Chinese people can be trusted.

The Chinese government fully understands the good wishes of peace-loving countries and people for the halting of all nuclear tests. But more and more countries are coming to

realize that the more the United States imperialists and their partners hold on to their nuclear monopoly, the more is there danger of a nuclear war breaking out.

They have it and you don't, and so they are very haughty. But once those who oppose them also have it, they would no longer be so haughty, their policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat would no longer be so effective, and the possibility for a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons would increase. We sincerely hope that a nuclear war would never occur. We are convinced that, so long as all peace-loving countries and people of the world make common efforts and persist in the struggle, a nuclear war can be prevented.

The Chinese government hereby formally proposes to the governments of the world that a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and that, as a first step, the summit conference should reach an agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which will soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them against nonnuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, nor against each other.

If those countries in possession of huge quantities of nuclear weapons are not even willing to undertake not to use them, how can those countries not yet in possession of them be expected to believe in their sincerity for peace and not to adopt possible and necessary defensive measures?

The Chinese government will, as always, exert every effort to promote the realization of the noble aim of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons through international consultations. Before the advent of such a day, the Chinese government and people will firmly and unswervingly march along their own road to strengthening their national defenses, defending their motherland and safeguarding world peace.

We are convinced that nuclear weapons, which are after all created by man, certainly will be eliminated by man.

U.S. IN SOUTHERN ASIA

(Continued from page 68)

view, the expansion of Chinese Communist influence over Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Laos and Indonesia might well place in greater jeopardy our obligations towards the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan.

It should be obvious that developing a policy for southern Asia—economic, political or military—is quite different from developing a policy for West Europe. In Asia, we face unstable governments, weak economies and peoples struggling to modernize under the most difficult conditions. The Chinese Communists insist they have a formula for the development of these countries and that their ideology is the true wave of the future. To dig our way out from under the complex policy questions now confronting us would at least seem to require a somewhat different approach—some new base points for policy. For too long and too often, in Washington, the huge bureaucracies within bureaucracies that constitute the state department, the defense department, AID and CIA have tended to deal with southern Asia on a country by country, problem by problem, program by program basis. Such a narrow approach risks missing the forest for the trees, hampers coordination of policy and actions and increases jurisdictional rivalry between agencies and within agencies.

It would seem that the time has come, if it is not too late, to tackle the dilemmas we face in the year ahead with full recognition of their interrelationship; to develop a broad strategic framework of policy so that programs bear some relationship to clearly defined over-all American objectives. It may be argued that our policy with respect to Asia has been spelled out in broad terms continuously. For public consumption, this may be adequate. But for those who must direct our military assistance programs, our aid programs, our information and cultural programs and our political relations with the countries of the area, in Washington or in

the field, broad, simple objectives (such as “supporting the free nations of Asia,” “helping people to help themselves”) are not enough. The able and conscientious officers in the field are too often in doubt as to how their own responsibilities relate to other activities we are conducting in the same country and are often unable to discover how a particular program relates to what the United States wants and is trying to do in the area as a whole.

To give only one example: the agreement for a “neutral” regime in Laos seems to have had little relationship to our objectives and action in South Vietnam either at that time or since. And it is ironic, indeed, to hear discussion of the possible need for a positive, military effort now to prevent complete Communist capture of Laos, when such an effort early in 1961 might have been successful with less risk.

However President Lyndon Johnson goes about resolving the complex and most difficult policy dilemmas we now face in southern Asia, one thing is certain: implementation of any policy or policies will require the utmost patience, the greatest resolve and a truly impressive exhibition of “staying power.” For no dramatic moves, no massive displays of military might, no other “winning combinations” are at all likely to alter the problems we face in this part of the world—problems we must somehow live with for a long time.

MALAYSIA'S FIRST YEAR

(Continued from page 88)

total was 33 dead and about 600 injured.

Tunku Abdul Rahman, overseas during the July riots, charged that Indonesian and Communist agents had instigated them. The timing of the September riots to coincide with the Malaysian anniversary observances was stressed. In any case, Indonesia stood to gain by so grave a symptom of internal disharmony. It bolstered the Indonesian claim that the formation of Malaysia had been premature.

Partly offsetting the somber tone of Ma-

laysia's first year were these factors: (1) the prospect of continued governmental stability as a result of the April elections; (2) a surprisingly sustained level of economic prosperity despite the Indonesian boycott; (3) apart from the apparent collaboration between Indonesia and some members of the Clandestine Communist Organization in Sarawak, no evidence of mass disaffection in the Borneo states after a year of intensive Indonesian guerrilla activity; and (4) a slight improvement in Malaysia's standing in the Afro-Asian world.

LAOS

(Continued from page 94)

Thailand's satisfaction fully two years after the end of the Geneva Conference.

Some Americans concerned with southeast Asian developments, such as former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman, advocated sending United States troops to Thailand as soon as the new Pathet Lao push manifested itself in April, 1964. Thailand's position on the question of American troops, as made clear to Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Bangkok in June, was that the Thais were not prepared to repeat their welcome of May, 1962, unless the American troops came on a continuing basis. The troops in 1962 had been recalled after a few weeks, but this time the Thais wanted them to stay on in Thailand or, better yet, to take up defensive positions in the Mekong Valley inside Laos. In the latter case, Thailand was also prepared to furnish a contingent. This question is still hanging fire as of this writing, and will certainly become acute if further Communist probes in Laos appear to threaten the security of Thailand.

OUTLOOK

In retrospect, therefore, it can be seen that the Geneva Protocol of 1962 did not prove to be a permanent settlement of the many dilemmas for United States policy posed by the poor and underpopulated coun-

try of Laos. On the other hand, properly enforced neutralization appears more than ever to be the only way that the United States can carry out its commitment to prevent Laos, and its neighbors, from being taken over by Communist guerrilla warfare without garrisoning these countries with United States troops, an action that would involve the United States in an onerous and endless military adventure on disadvantageous terms.

Neutralization can be made to work to the advantage of the West, however, only if it is backed up by credible sanctions. This became more than ever essential after the invalidation of the premise on which the 1962 neutralization attempt was made—the premise that the Soviet Union, desiring to avoid a showdown with the United States over Laos, could ensure the translation of this desire into reality on the ground in Laos.

The theory of neutralization remains valid. In an age of the mutual cancellation of nuclear threats, it remains the best possible hope for damping down brushfire wars. The United States will have to be more flexible in its diplomacy and more resourceful in its application of the vast military force at its disposal in order to make it work satisfactorily.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

(Continued from page 108)

laysia was established, ASA stopped functioning. The reason, of course, was that the Philippines refused to recognize "Malaysia" because of the Manila claim to North Borneo. But in the wake of those events, ASA was not disbanded. In each of the three capitals, an "ASA National Secretariat" continued in formal existence, and in the Philippines, at the end of 1964, it was being revitalized. This step underscored the continuing interest among these three nations in making cooperation work, and it also underscored the obvious: that the "potential" for cooperation will remain only a potential as long as there is no mediation of the region's political conflicts, for those are just as real as the desire for cooperation.

VIETNAM

(Continued from page 102)

a conventional United States landing in the North could be conducted with about one-half of them, in addition to the local militia forces constantly available and armed.

That would leave perhaps six to eight divisions to invade sorely-pressed South Vietnam. And, lest this be forgotten (it is, of course), the Japanese took all of mainland Southeast Asia from Singapore to Mandalay with six divisions.

What a Red Chinese intervention would do to such an operation is anyone's guess, but Korea permits a few good estimates.

CONCLUSIONS

That leaves the West in general, and the United States in particular, in the throes of a dilemma aptly described by Walter Lippmann as the choice between "unattainable victory and unacceptable defeat." As the year 1964 ended, the consensus seemed to converge toward a more or less temporary stabilization along the lower reaches of points 5 to 7 of the above scale. The advantage of such an approach is that it stays within the realm, for good or ill, of what has already been experienced; and there exist some remote chances that alternate approaches by third parties on both sides may bring about a "thaw" in the presently-frozen positions.

Some sources aver that Hanoi and Peking, and these two and the Liberation Front, may not be as unified as it appears on the surface. The usually reliable *Le Monde* expert Georges Chaffard reported in November, 1964, that Peking might be in the process of "leapfrogging" Hanoi with the N.L.F.S.V. to take over directly the backing of the latter's operations. Chaffard (echoing other French views) feels that Hanoi, now truly worried about an extended American "spasm-reaction" or a deliberate shift toward policy ranges 7-8 of the above scale, might be willing to settle for a

compromise that neither Peking nor the N.L.F.S.V. find acceptable.²²

Approaches made by Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach (a South Vietnamese guerrilla leader during the First Indochina War and now Minister of Health in the North Vietnamese government) to Vietnamese exiles in France during a recent visit seem to have echoed a similar tendency.

If such a fissure indeed exists within the Asian Communist complex involved in Vietnam, then perhaps application of a solution within the 3-4 range of the above scale could become conceivable without endangering the ever-fragile and volatile South Vietnamese political-military gossamer. As often before, American policies—indeed, the West's whole position—in Southeast Asia are at a crossroads. But that crossroads is dangerously close to the point of no-return.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 113)

mankind teetering on the verge of disaster, the Jews pushed over the brink. In this gadarene morality tale—a version in which the swine do the pushing whilst it is men who die—Jewish fate mirrors humanity's own, with anti-Semitism a more specific instance of anti-humanism; the rise of an anti-Semitic myth paralleling that of other destructive popular myths; rejection of the Jews preceding and exaggerating that of other social or national groups; the intolerance, irrationalism and brutality that pursued them, aspects of similar and more generalized reactions.

Dr. Pulzer has given us a brief but useful study of this highly significant phenomenon, as it developed in Central Europe.

Here is a useful companion to Robert Byrne's *Anti-Semitism in Modern France*: one which could have been pressed further, to greater historical and sociological detail, but which as it stands furnishes much-needed information and some clear thinking in an area where we can do with them. E.W.

²² Georges Chaffard, "Par-dessus Ho Chi Minh," *L'Express*, November 15, 1964.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of December, 1964, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Alliance for Progress

Dec. 9—The Alliance for Progress Conference ends after establishing a permanent Special Coordinating Committee for Latin America to promote trade.

Arab States

Dec. 11—*Pravda* (Soviet Communist party newspaper) publishes an announcement that delegates from Arab Communist countries have secretly held a meeting within the last 10 days at an undisclosed site; the conference urged the unity of all "revolutionaries" in North Africa and the Middle East.

Berlin

Dec. 11—Western officials in Berlin report that Soviet diplomats in East Berlin have suggested that the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union meet regularly on "matters of joint interest."

Dec. 19—West Berliners are permitted to visit relatives in East Berlin on the first of a 16-day visiting period.

Dec. 20—It is reported that the Soviet embassy in Berlin has rejected an Allied proposal for resuming 4-power consultations in Berlin.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Dec. 1—West German Minister of Agriculture Werner Schwarz tells the Council of Ministers that West Germany will lower its grain prices on condition that France promise to cooperate in achieving a successful outcome to the "Kennedy round" of

negotiations for tariff reductions and trade expansion within GATT.

Dec. 15—The E.E.C.'s Council of Ministers reaches tentative agreement on a common grain price to become effective on July 1, 1967. (See also *Germany*.)

Dec. 16—French President Charles de Gaulle praises the grain price agreement.

West Germany's cabinet approves the agreement on a common grain price.

Dec. 29—It is disclosed that on Jan. 1, the E.E.C. countries will further reduce their internal tariffs on industrial goods by 10 per cent.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Dec. 4—At a 3-day French-German conference in Paris, French Premier Georges Pompidou urges West German officials to reject closer NATO ties.

Dec. 11—At a meeting in Britain, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker inform West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder of Wilson's talks with U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson on modifying a proposed nuclear fleet (M.L.F.) for NATO.

Dec. 13—In Paris, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly reaffirms the U.S. commitment to NATO. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Dec. 14—In Paris, Rusk confers with French President de Gaulle on the nuclear force.

Dec. 15—The Ministerial Council opens its 34th meeting in Paris. West Germany and the U.S. support a nuclear force for NATO; France, Belgium, Norway and Denmark oppose the project. British Foreign Secre-

tary Gordon Walker supports an allied nuclear force.

Dec. 16—U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara tells the NATO Council that the U.S. has allocated 40 per cent of its nuclear stockpile to the defense of Europe. It is reported that in talks with Rusk, de Gaulle has recognized the need to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Dec. 17—In a communiqué, the Ministerial Council asserts that discussion of a nuclear force should be continued. The U.S., Britain, West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands schedule a conference on an international force for next month.

Organization of American States

Dec. 18—An O.A.S. conference approves a resolution providing for admission of new members; it will be known as "The Act of Washington."

United Nations

Dec. 1—The U.N. General Assembly opens its 1964 session. The deadlock over payment of arrears has been temporarily bypassed by an agreement to delay voting until general debate is completed; the solution was negotiated by U.N. Secretary-General U Thant and representatives of France, the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain. Ghana's Alex Quaison-Sackey is elected president of the General Assembly by acclamation. President Alex Quaison-Sackey rules that there are no objections to the Assembly's election to membership of Malawi, Malta and Zambia, raising the total number of members to 115.

Dec. 2—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko confer for 3 hours in New York. Sources report that the Soviet Union is willing to negotiate the issue of financing U.N. peace-keeping operations.

The U.N. announces the purchase of a building to serve as a training institute for diplomats.

Dec. 3—The U.S. delegation recommends that U.N. Secretary-General U Thant

negotiate the payment of arrears owed to the U.N. Under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, any country over 2 years behind in contributions loses its voting privileges in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union is \$52.6 million in arrears. These talks are to proceed independently of Soviet-U.S. negotiations on the overall question of authorizing and financing U.N. peace-keeping forces.

Dec. 7—Addressing the General Assembly, Gromyko declares that the Soviet Union wishes to form friendly ties with West Germany.

Dec. 9—The Security Council opens debate on a complaint that the U.S.-Belgian rescue operation in the Congo was a threat to peace. The Soviet Union condemns U.S. support for Congolese Premier Moise Tshombe. The Congolese government complains that the rebels are receiving Communist aid.

Dec. 11—Cuban Minister of Industry Ernesto Ché Guevara addresses the General Assembly; he asserts that the U.S. plans to attack Cuba. As he speaks a bazooka shell is fired from across the East River at U.N. headquarters. It falls into the water 200 yards from shore.

Dec. 14—The U.S. Representative to the U.N., Adlai E. Stevenson, defends the Congo rescue operation. He warns the African states that they must refrain from trying to upset neighboring governments which they dislike.

Dec. 17—The Soviet delegate to the U.N., Nikolai T. Fedorenko, tells the U.N. Security Council that the Congolese government under Tshombe is a puppet for "foreign monopolies," including the U.S.

Dec. 18—The Security Council votes to extend the U.N. peace-keeping operation in Cyprus for 3 months until March 26, 1965.

Dec. 20—Gromyko departs for the Soviet Union.

Dec. 21—The Soviet Union vetoes a resolution in the Security Council asking Israel and Syria to avoid future border clashes.

Some 40 delegates walk out of the General Assembly during an address by South

African Foreign Minister Hilgard Müller in which he defends apartheid.

Dec. 22—Three Cubans, foes of the Castro government, are arrested and accused of firing a bazooka at the U.N.

Dec. 29—A deadlock between Jordan and Mali results over a contest for a seat on the Security Council. In uncontested races for Security Council seats, Uruguay, the Netherlands and Malaysia are chosen.

Dec. 30—The U.N. Security Council in a 10-0 vote approves a resolution urging the end of foreign interference in the Congo, the withdrawal of mercenary soldiers and a cease-fire.

The U.N. General Assembly recesses until Jan. 18. Mali and Jordan agree to a split term on the Security Council. U Thant, in accord with a Soviet demand, makes no mention of an appeal for contributions to a "rescue fund." The impasse over arrears payments remains unsettled.

Dec. 31—It is reported that the failure of the General Assembly to vote assessments for the coming year means that the U.N. will have to borrow money to meet its expenses.

ALGERIA

Dec. 2—President Ahmed Ben Bella announces a new and enlarged 18-member cabinet.

Dec. 19—Visiting Cuban Minister of Industry Ernesto Ché Guevara confers with Ben Bella.

ARGENTINA

Dec. 2—Ousted Argentine dictator, Juan D. Peron, lands in Brazil, in an attempt to keep his promise to return to Argentina by Dec. 31. The Brazilian government refuses to allow him to proceed. He disembarks to wait for a return flight to Spain. (See also *Spain*.)

BRAZIL

Dec. 14—The U.S. and Brazil reveal that the U.S. will give Brazil \$1 billion in aid.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Canada

Dec. 15—The House of Commons votes, 163-78, for a new flag with a maple leaf design to replace the Union Jack design.

Ceylon

Dec. 4—Following a vote of no confidence yesterday, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike dissolves the parliament.

Cyprus

(See *Intl*, *U.N.*)

Great Britain

Dec. 6—Prime Minister Harold Wilson arrives in Washington for talks with U.S. President Johnson. (See also *Intl*, *NATO* and *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Dec. 8—In the House of Commons the Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, elaborates on the government's proposals to reform corporate and capital gains taxation (believed to be one of the reasons behind last month's sterling crisis).

Dec. 9—At a news conference in the U.S., Wilson states that Britain is not opposed to the U.S. proposal for a multilateral mixed-manned nuclear fleet (M.L.F.); Wilson stipulates that such a force must be subject to "overriding United States consent or veto on the use of any nuclear weapon."

Wilson flies to Canada to talk with Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson.

Dec. 16—Prime Minister Wilson reports to the House of Commons on talks with President Johnson for a multilateral force. The U.S. proposal is for a surface fleet of 25 ships. Wilson declares that he has proposed a nuclear force incorporating British bombers and U.S. and British nuclear submarines.

The Board of Trade announces that the British balance of trade deficit has increased.

Dec. 17—The Bank of England acts to support government bonds and sterling.

Dec. 18—The British government announces

the deferment of payments of \$175 million to Canada and the U.S. for loans contracted at the end of World War II.

Dec. 21—By a vote of 355-170, the House of Commons approves a bill outlawing the death penalty in Britain.

India

(See *Vatican*)

Kenya

Dec. 12—Kenya becomes a republic within the British Commonwealth one year after becoming independent. Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta is sworn in as president.

Malaysia, Federation of

Dec. 14—The British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, George Thomson, tells the House of Commons that Britain will honor its commitment to defend Malaysia, under attack from Indonesia.

Dec. 25—The Malaysian Ministry of Information reports that the British frigate *Ajax* captured 22 Indonesian guerrillas heading for a landing at Kuala Selangor.

Nigeria

Dec. 28—President Nnamdi Azikiwe and the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, fail to reach agreement on holding federal elections scheduled for December 30.

Dec. 29—Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa announces that elections will be held tomorrow.

Dec. 30—The United Progressive Grand Alliance boycotts the election. The Grand Alliance calls for a conference to dissolve the Federation of Nigeria.

Pakistan

Dec. 26—The armed forces are placed on alert as tension mounts over the first presidential election scheduled for early January, 1965.

BRITISH TERRITORIES, THE

British Guiana

Dec. 7—Elections for a new government are held.

Dec. 9—Final returns reveal that Premier Cheddi Jagan and his People's Progressive party received 45.81 per cent of the vote, or 24 seats in the 53-member legislature. The People's National Congress won 22 seats, and the United Force, 7 seats.

Dec. 10—Premier Jagan tells Sir Richard Luyt, the British Governor, that the election was fraudulent; he refuses to resign.

Dec. 14—Following a British government Privy Council order for Jagan's removal, Sir Richard swears in Forbes Burnham, head of the People's National Congress party, as premier. The United Force and the P.N.C. will form a coalition.

Rhodesia

Dec. 19—Sir Roy Welensky resigns as the leader of the opposition Rhodesia party.

South Arabia, Federation of

Dec. 7—Following a meeting in Britain between leaders of the Federation member states and the British government, a ministerial statement is issued announcing that a conference will be held next year on transforming the Federation into a unitary state.

CAMBODIA

Dec. 8—U.S. and Cambodian delegates open negotiations in New Delhi, India. Cambodia has accused the U.S. of being involved in South Vietnamese violations of the Cambodian border. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Dec. 2—It is reported that under a nongovernmental agreement, Italy and China will exchange permanent trade missions.

Dec. 29—The Chinese Communists issue a statement denouncing the first patrol by the U.S. nuclear submarine *Daniel Boone* off the Chinese mainland.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Dec. 1—The U.S. and Belgium inform the

FRANCE

U.N. Security Council that their rescue operation in the Congo has ended. (See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Dec. 2—Premier Moise Tshombe leaves for home after a 3-day visit to France.

Dec. 3—It is reported by reliable sources that additional mercenaries from South Africa and Rhodesia will soon join Major Michael Hoare's Fifth Brigade, fighting in the Congo.

Dec. 4—Premier Tshombe announces that the national government has "reappropriated" all Congolese mining concessions formerly controlled by 3 private Belgian-Congo organizations. Henceforth mining companies will buy the right to land exploitation from Tshombe's government.

Dec. 5—*The New York Times* reports that Communist bloc sources have disclosed that the Soviet Union has agreed to supply arms and to help finance an airlift to send arms to the Congolese rebels.

Dec. 7—Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak announces that Tshombe will not implement his decree cancelling concession rights until the 2 men have conferred.

Dec. 10—Premier Tshombe is received in audience by Pope Paul VI.

Dec. 12—Tshombe arrives in West Germany.

Dec. 15—The U.S. Ambassador, G. McMurtre Godley, leaves for consultations in Washington. The commander of the Congolese Army, Colonel Joseph D. Mobutu, declares that the Congolese rebels are receiving aid from the U.A.R., Algeria, Mali and Ghana, among others.

Dec. 20—Congolese Premier Moise Tshombe leaves Belgium after talks with Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak and the U.S. Ambassador.

Dec. 31—Rejecting the Security Council plea for a cease-fire, President Joseph Kasavubu affirms a policy of "pacification of the country, whatever it may cost."

CUBA

Dec. 8—A government communiqué announces that Augusta Martinez Sanchez shot himself after his dismissal yesterday as minister of labor. (See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Dec. 2—French Premier Georges Pompidou tells the National Assembly that Europe needs its own nuclear force independent of "someone outside Europe." (See also *Intl, NATO.*)

Dec. 6—It is reported that President Charles de Gaulle has told the U.S. he will denounce the French-German Treaty of Friendship if Germany joins a multilateral nuclear force within the NATO alliance.

Dec. 10—The senate rejects a bill for a \$10.9 billion military program over a 6-year period. The national assembly has approved the bill.

Dec. 31—President de Gaulle, in a radio and television address, urges Frenchmen to work for economic progress at home and independence abroad to avoid U.S. hegemony.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (WEST)

Dec. 2—Chancellor Ludwig Erhard tells the West German parliament that the government's decision to lower its grain prices is a "sacrifice" to achieve European union. The Common Market is trying to establish a common price for grain. (See also *Intl, Berlin* and *E.E.C.*)

Dec. 9—West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder confers in Paris with French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. Schröder presses the West German plan for a standing conference of Russia, France, Great Britain and the U.S. to negotiate German reunification.

INDONESIA

(See *British Commonwealth, Malaysia.*)

ISRAEL

Dec. 2—Israeli and Syrian forces fire at each other along their common border for the second day.

Dec. 14—Premier Levi Eshkol resigns following a conflict within his Mapai party over reopening an espionage and sabotage case.

Dec. 22—Premier Eshkol forms a new coalition.

tion government which the Knesset (parliament) approves, 59-36.

ITALY

Dec. 6—Antonio Segni, the fourth president of the Italian Republic, resigns because of poor health.

Dec. 28—On the 21st ballot, the national assembly elects Giuseppe Saragat as president. Saragat is the head of the Democratic Socialist party.

KOREA

Dec. 31—Kim Jong Pil, a controversial figure who left Korea on request for 7 months, returns.

KUWAIT

Dec. 29—Sheik Abdullah al-Salem al-Sabah asks Crown Prince Sabah to form a new government.

LAOS

Dec. 21—It is reported that the Laotian government has agreed privately to step up air attacks against the Ho Chi Minh trail, including possible participation by U.S. pilots. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Dec. 26—It is reported by reliable sources that Deputy Premier Phoumi Nosavan has told South Vietnamese officials that Laos has stepped up its attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

MEXICO

Dec. 1—Gustavo Diaz Ordaz is inaugurated as president for a 6-year term; he succeeds Adolfo Lopez Mateos.

PANAMA

Dec. 18—In a radio and television speech, President Marco A. Robles expresses his delight at U.S. President Johnson's announcement that a new Panama Canal treaty will be negotiated. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

Dec. 11—The *Government Gazette* an-

nounces that the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, applying to over 7 million "Blacks" living outside the Bantustans, will take effect January 1, 1965.

SPAIN

Dec. 24—The Spanish government authorizes ex-Argentine dictator, Juan D. Peron, to return to his villa in Madrid. Last week Peron stated in writing that he would not engage in political activity. (See also *Argentina*.)

SUDAN, THE

Dec. 7—Racial fighting between Africans and Arabs in Khartoum last night and today results in at least 10 deaths and 400 persons injured.

Dec. 12—Premier Sir el-Khatim el-Khalifa announces an amnesty for all southern Sudanese (mostly Africans) who have fled the Sudan since 1955. The 3 African southern provinces have been demanding their independence from the Arab northern Sudan.

SYRIA

Dec. 14—The Damascus radio announces that Major General Mohammed Omran, second only to President Amin el-Hafez, has resigned; he leaves for Spain where he will serve as ambassador.

Dec. 24—It is disclosed that the Presidency Council has agreed not to grant oil and mineral exploitation concessions to outsiders.

TUNISIA

Dec. 9—King Hassan II of Morocco and Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba attend the signing of 8 conventions between their countries.

U.S.S.R., THE

Dec. 4—After 4 days of talks between Soviet leaders and Czech President Antonin Novotny, a communiqué is issued calling for a world Communist conference.

Dec. 5—Two government decrees are an-

nounced in *Trud* (the labor union newspaper). One decree provides for speeding up the cooperative housing program. The second decree provides for discounting inferior, high-priced or outdated consumer goods in special cut-price stores.

Dec. 6—*Pravda* (Communist party newspaper) publishes an editorial announcing that the role of the Communist party is to offer "political guidance"; the party must allow competent government officials "to solve concrete questions." The local Soviets (legislative assemblies) are eventually to solve "all local issues."

Dec. 9—Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin addresses the opening of the Supreme Soviet (parliament). He promises economic reforms: lower prices, higher wages, and more consumer goods for 1965. In a bid for increased Western trade, Kosygin declares that the Soviet Union would be willing to include in its long-range plans prospects for an expanded trade program with the West.

Kosygin also announces that the Soviet military budget will be cut by 500 million rubles (\$555 million) in 1965; the military budget will total 12.8 billion rubles (\$14.2 billion). According to Kosygin, the cut was made after the Soviet Union was informed that the U.S. military budget would be reduced.

Prior to Kosygin's speech, the deputies ratified the ouster of ex-Premier Khrushchev on Oct. 15 and his replacement by Kosygin.

Dec. 11—The Supreme Soviet ends its 3-day session. The budget and economic plans submitted by Kosygin are approved.

Dec. 12—*Pravda* publishes a front page announcement that a commission will meet in Moscow on March 1, 1965, to plan an international Communist meeting.

Dec. 27—Addressing the National Assembly of the U.A.R., Soviet Deputy Premier Aleksandr N. Shelepin strongly affirms Moscow's friendship for the U.A.R.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Dec. 20—A U.A.R. source confirms that a

U.S. plane, owned by a Houston, Texas, oil company, was shot down yesterday after it ignored warnings by U.A.R. jets; 2 persons aboard were killed. (See also U.S., *Foreign Policy*.)

UNITED STATES, THE Agriculture

Dec. 31—Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman announces that research stations and projects will be cut back for a savings of \$5 million annually. Certain reorganizational changes are also planned.

Economy

Dec. 2—Addressing the Business Council, President Lyndon B. Johnson states that an increase in bank lending rates should not follow the recent increase in the Federal Reserve System's discount rate. Such a move might cause an economic slowdown.

Dec. 3—The First National Bank of Boston cancels the increase in its lending rate from 4.5 to 4.75 per cent, announced 2 days ago.

Dec. 16—President Johnson announces that \$82.6 million will be allocated for 162 new antipoverty projects in 50 states.

Dec. 18—President Johnson announces that personal income in the U.S. now exceeds a record \$500 billion dollar annual rate.

Fourteen prominent businessmen meet President Johnson for over 3 hours; they express confidence in the economy and hope the budget can be kept under \$100 billion.

Dec. 25—According to statisticians at the Department of Commerce, the gross national product in 1964 will total about \$624 billion, compared to \$584 billion in 1963.

Foreign Policy

Dec. 1—In a 2 and one-half hour meeting, President Johnson and U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Maxwell D. Taylor review the war in South Vietnam and U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Johnson directs Taylor to urge the South Vietnamese government to strengthen its war effort against the pro-Communist Vietcong rebels. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Dec. 3—In a foreign policy speech at the 175th anniversary convocation of Georgetown University, Johnson indicates that the U.S. will go ahead with its plan for a mixed-manned nuclear fleet under NATO, with "those . . . who are ready to proceed in common ventures." Johnson receives an honorary Doctor of Laws degree; a Doctor of Laws degree is posthumously awarded the late President John F. Kennedy. (See also *Intl, NATO and U.N.*; and *British Commonwealth, Great Britain.*)

Dec. 4—At ceremonies to award the Medal of Honor to Army Captain Roger Donlon (the first given for action in the South Vietnamese war), Johnson reaffirms the U.S. commitment to halt communism there.

Dec. 7—Meeting in Washington, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and President Johnson confer for almost 3 hours.

Dec. 8—A communiqué is issued after 2 days of talks between Wilson and Johnson; they recognize the need to strengthen the "strategic nuclear defense" of the Atlantic alliance. The communiqué discloses that British proposals for a more broadly based Atlantic nuclear force and the U.S. plan for a multilateral force were included in the discussion.

Dec. 9—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko confers in Washington for over an hour with President Johnson. Gromyko calls the talk "useful." Earlier, Gromyko met with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

Secretary Rusk issues a statement charging that recent attacks on U.S. libraries in foreign countries seem to have the acquiescence of the host countries. Recently U.S. Information Agency libraries in the U.A.R., the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia were attacked.

Dec. 10—The Soviet Union agrees to pay damages to the U.S. for an attack on the U.S. embassy last month.

Dec. 17—Talks held in India between the U.S. and Cambodia end in deadlock. The talks were to negotiate Cambodian charges of U.S. and South Vietnamese aggression along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.

Dec. 18—In a White House statement, Presi-

dent Johnson announces that the U.S. will construct a new sea-level canal in Central America or Colombia to link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Dec. 19—Negotiations between Panama and the U.S. to renegotiate the 1903 Panama Canal treaty are scheduled for January, 1965.

Dec. 20—*The New York Times* reports that President Johnson, in a National Security Council memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, has instructed U.S. officials to avoid "pressure tactics" in discussing U.S. proposals for a mixed-manned nuclear fleet.

Dec. 24—The U.S. Ambassador to the U.A.R. protests the shooting of a U.S. oil company plane by U.A.R. MIG's. The U.A.R. Foreign Minister issues a communiqué denying any responsibility for the attack.

Dec. 28—It is reported that the U.S. State Department has postponed a decision to supply \$35 million worth of surplus foods to the U.A.R. until after January 1. (See also *U.A.R.*)

Dec. 29—In a message to the U.S.S.R., Johnson asks the Soviet Union to join in a program for increased arms control.

Government

Dec. 1—At the Senate Rules Committee investigation into the affairs of the former secretary of the Senate Democratic majority, Robert (Bobby) Baker, insurance man Don Reynolds testifies that he received a premium overpayment of \$35,000 from Matthew McCloskey. Supposedly \$25,000 was channeled into the 1960 Democratic campaign fund.

Dec. 2—A federal court jury finds John W. Butenko, a U.S. engineer, and Igor A. Ivanov, a Soviet citizen, guilty of conspiring to commit espionage.

Matthew McCloskey, builder of the Washington, D.C. stadium, tells the committee that his company overpaid an insurance premium by \$35,000 as a "goof."

Dec. 9—President Johnson receives the report of his Commission on Heart Disease,

Cancer and Stroke: The Commission recommends a \$29.4 billion program, including a national network of treatment centers to make heart, cancer and stroke care available to all.

Dec. 10—Addressing 400 delegates to an antipoverty workshop, President Johnson pledges to promote "the full assimilation of more than 20 million Negroes into American life." Johnson announces that Vice-President elect Hubert Humphrey will coordinate the equal opportunity programs of the federal government.

The White House announces that Richard N. Goodwin has been named a special assistant to the President.

Dec. 11—The Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Courtney A. Evans, declares that he will resign at the end of the month.

Dec. 12—President Johnson meets with the new Economic Opportunity Council; it will advise on coordinating the various efforts in the antipoverty campaign.

The *Congressional Quarterly* publishes the official vote returns from the 50 states and the District of Columbia, revealing that 70,640,289 voters went to the polls on November 3. President Johnson received 43,121,085 votes; Senator Goldwater (Republican presidential candidate from Arizona) received 27,145,161.

Dec. 14—The Electoral College meets; 486 Democratic electors vote for President Johnson and his running mate, Hubert Humphrey; 52 Republican electors vote for Goldwater and vice-presidential candidate William E. Miller.

Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges resigns. President Johnson names John T. Connor, president of Merck and Co., Inc., to succeed Hodges.

Dec. 18—The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, Burke Marshall, resigns. Johnson announces that John Doar, Marshall's deputy, will be promoted to the post.

Butenko is sentenced to 30 years in prison; Ivanov, to 20 years.

The Atomic Energy Commission reveals

that it has sent letters to 2 companies warning them that the U.S. is under an obligation not to sell equipment abroad that could be used for nuclear weapons, according to the terms of the test-ban treaty. One of the letters asks the companies to notify the A.E.C. of any orders by France or any other country for such equipment.

Dec. 23—Budget Director Kermit Gordon declares that budget requests by government departments totaling \$108.5 billion have been cut by President Johnson.

Dec. 24—President Johnson declares flood-stricken sections of California and Oregon federal disaster areas. The West Coast has suffered 4 days of storms.

Dec. 26—Johnson announces that he will appoint William J. Driver (a civil servant) as Administrator of Veterans Affairs; he succeeds John S. Gleason.

Dec. 28—The President's personal physician, Rear Adm. George Burkley, officially announces that Johnson's health is "excellent."

Johnson names Sheldon S. Cohen to serve as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; he succeeds Mortimer Caplin who resigned last July. Frederick L. Deming is named Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs; he succeeds Robert Roosa.

Labor

Dec. 5—Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz announces that he has approved a contract with the Institute of Computer Technology to train unemployed persons in electronic data processing.

Dec. 8—Three railway shopcraft unions call a strike for December 15. The 180 railroads file for an injunction against the strike in a federal district court. Yesterday negotiations with Secretary Wirtz to avoid the strike were deadlocked.

Dec. 9—The United Mine Workers of America announces that unofficial returns indicate W. A. Boyle has been elected president.

Dec. 14—Negotiators for the 11 main steel

companies issue a statement criticizing proposals by the United Steelworkers of America for higher wages. The steel companies ask the unions to reconsider the reopening of their contracts on January 1; they expire May 1. Previously, Steelworkers President David J. McDonald and R. Conrad Cooper, chief negotiator for the steel industry, held a joint news conference.

The 3 shopcraft unions postpone their strike against the railroads until after January 1, 1965. The postponement is announced coincidentally with a federal district judge's issuance of a 10-day restraining order to the unions.

Dec. 15—Formal negotiations between the steel industry and the union begin.

Dec. 16—The International Longshoremen's Association and the N.Y. Shipping Association reach agreement on a new contract. Longshoremen win an 80-cent-an-hour package guaranteeing work, wage increases, and additional welfare benefits; work gangs will be reduced from 20 to 17 men. This agreement applies to the N.Y. port only, but such contracts usually serve as a guideline for other ports.

Dec. 17—President Johnson meets with President of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. George Meany and other labor leaders; he pledges to uphold the Democratic platform plank urging the repeal of state "right to work" laws.

Dec. 20—The President of the Gulf and South Atlantic District of the I.L.A. declares that members will continue to work during contract negotiations. Last night the 80-day injunction against a strike expired.

Dec. 21—A wildcat dockers' strike creates a slowdown in the Port of New York. In Baltimore, 1,000 longshoremen strike.

Dec. 23—The New York wildcat dock strike ends. The Baltimore walkout continues. I.L.A. officials have tried to persuade longshoremen from Maine to Texas to continue working until January 11, when all 372 locals will have completed voting on the master contract agreed on in New York on December 16.

Dec. 24—Federal Judge J. S. Perry refuses to

grant an injunction against 3 railroad shopcraft unions; he issues a temporary restraining order effective during an appeal of his decision.

Military

Dec. 12—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announces the incorporation of organized units of the Army's Ready Reserve into the National Guard. Some 150,000 reservists will be allowed to transfer to the Army National Guard. Others will be placed in a standby manpower pool. The National Guard will reach a paid drill strength of 550,000 men. In addition, McNamara announces restrictions on the use of military facilities and airplanes by traveling congressmen.

Dec. 22—Defense Secretary McNamara announces that General John Paul McConnell will be appointed Air Force Chief of Staff following the retirement of General Curtis E. LeMay on Jan. 31, 1965.

After a conference with President Johnson at the LBJ ranch, McNamara announces that the President will ask Congress to appropriate \$157 million to develop a military transport plane capable of carrying 600 soldiers.

Politics

Dec. 4—The Republican Governors Association meets in Denver, Colorado, to discuss the future of the Republican party. The Chairman, Governor Robert Smylie of Idaho, asserts that new leadership is needed.

Dec. 5—The 17 Republican Governors issue a statement calling for the reorganization of the Republican National Committee to represent "all the basic strength of the party." N.Y. Governor Nelson Rockefeller says that the statement, in effect, asks for the removal of Dean Burch as Republican National Chairman.

Dec. 9—Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, former Vice-President Richard Nixon, and Senator Barry Goldwater (defeated Republican presidential candidate)

confer privately in New York City on Dean Burch's leadership of the Republican party.
Dec. 28—In a letter sent to the 132 members of the Republican National Committee, Senator Barry Goldwater warns that the removal of National Chairman Dean Burch would be "a repudiation of me."

Segregation

Dec. 2—The U.S. Court of Appeals for the fourth circuit rules against the Virginia system of tuition grants to white students attending separate segregated schools in Prince George and Surry Counties, Virginia, as "a transparent evasion of the 14th Amendment."

Dec. 4—The F.B.I. arrests the Neshoba County (Miss.) sheriff, his deputy, and 19 other men (mostly Ku Klux Klan members). Two are charged with refusing to give information about the slaying; 19 are charged with conspiring to violate the civil rights of the 3 victims.

Dec. 10—In a preliminary hearing, the F.B.I. reports that it has a signed confession from one of the 21 men. U.S. Commissioner Esther Carter refuses to admit the F.B.I. agent's testimony that a confession was signed. Justice Department attorney Robert Owen refuses to present more evidence. He asks that a grand jury "be called as soon as possible." The defendants are dismissed from their bonds and the charges against 19 of them are dismissed.

Martin Luther King Jr. accepts the Nobel Peace Prize as a "trustee" for the civil rights movement.

Dec. 11—In Biloxi, Miss., government attorneys request the dismissal of conspiracy charges against the 20th defendant in the civil rights workers' murder case and the charges are dismissed. Similar government action is expected in the case of the 21st defendant.

Dec. 13—The executive director of the N.A.A.C.P., Roy Wilkins, in a memorandum released today and previously sent to financial organizations, asks them to re-

frain from bidding on 3 Mississippi bond issues to be offered this week.

Dec. 15—The Pearl River Valley Water Supply District in Miss. receives no acceptable bids for \$24.65 million of bonds.

Dec. 16—The State of Mississippi sells \$8.7 million in 2 school-bond issues.

Dec. 20—The first group of students and faculty from Oberlin College, Ohio, arrives in Ripley, Miss., to help rebuild a Negro church that was burned. Students from other colleges will also participate.

Supreme Court

Dec. 7—The Supreme Court unanimously finds unconstitutional a Florida statute making it unlawful for a man and woman, one white and one Negro, to "occupy in the nighttime the same room."

Dec. 14—In 2 cases testing the validity of the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court unanimously rules that Congress has the power, under the interstate commerce clause, to outlaw racial discrimination affecting commerce. The cases were brought by the Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia and Ollie's Barbecue in Birmingham, Ala. The motel conceded it sought the patronage of interstate travelers. Ollie's Barbecue came within the provisions of the Act because the meat it served came from out-of-state.

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court decides that the Civil Rights Act outlaws trespass prosecutions of Negroes who participated in sit-ins at lunch counters in Rock Hill, S.C., and Little Rock, Ark., in 1960. Title II of the Act forbids discrimination in public accommodations or prosecution of those seeking service in such establishments.

VATICAN, THE

Dec. 2—Pope Paul VI departs for the International Eucharistic Congress in India.

Dec. 3—In Bombay, Pope Paul VI meets with Indian President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and others. In an open air cere-

mony, he consecrates 6 bishops, 3 from Africa, and 1 each from India, Ecuador and Australia.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Dec. 3—The National Buddhist Association demands that the U.S. withdraw its support of the government of Premier Tran Van Huong.

Dec. 4—After a 2-day meeting, the military leaders of South Vietnam issue 2 communiqués announcing their support of the Huong government.

Dec. 6—U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor, on returning from consultations in the U.S., reads a statement declaring that the U.S. will "provide greater assistance" for Vietnam. (See also U.S., *Foreign Policy*.)

Dec. 8—Ambassador Taylor meets with the chief of state, Phan Khac Suu, and members of the High National Council (provisional legislature). It is reported that Taylor is urging a stepped up war effort against the pro-Communist Vietcong rebels.

Dec. 11—A communiqué is issued disclosing that the U.S. and South Vietnam have agreed to increase their efforts against Communist infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh trail running through North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietnam. Additional U.S. military aid is promised. The U.S. expresses support for Huong.

In a 5-point communiqué and a letter to Phan Khac Suu, the Buddhists charge the U.S. with maintaining Huong in power against the wishes of "the Vietnamese people and the Buddhist Church."

Dec. 12—The 3 senior members of the National Buddhist Association begin a 48-hour hunger strike to protest against the government.

Dec. 20—The Saigon radio broadcasts a military communiqué announcing that the Military Council has ousted the High National Council. Phan Khac Suu and the civilian cabinet led by Premier Tran Van Huong will apparently remain in power. Some members of the High National Council are arrested.

Dec. 22—A statement by Lieutenant General Nguyen Khanh is broadcast, supporting the dissolution of the High National Council and rejecting U.S. opposition to the role of the military; he criticizes U.S. interference.

The U.S. State Department issues a statement with the approval of U.S. President Johnson defending its policy in South Vietnam; the U.S. warns that its continued support is linked to the establishment of a constitutional government.

Dec. 23—In a news conference, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk declares that civilian and military officials in South Vietnam must work together; he warns that otherwise certain kinds of aid will be "simply not feasible."

Dec. 24—Terrorists in Saigon bomb a U.S. officers' billet; 2 Americans are dead and 52 wounded. 13 Vietnamese are injured.

Dec. 28—Premier Huong and Phan Khac Suu issue a communiqué criticizing last week's military coup. They urge that a constitutional civilian government be permitted to govern.

It is reported that Vietnamese soldiers, in a 2-day battle, captured the headquarters of a Vietcong general and seized a cache of arms.

Dec. 31—Lieutenant General Khanh confers with Phan Khac Suu and Premier Huong.

YEMEN

Dec. 27—It is reported that 24 of the 25 Yemeni cabinet ministers have resigned. It is also reported that fighting between republicans and royalists has been resumed following the failure of negotiations to end the civil war. A cease-fire was arranged last month.

YUGOSLAVIA

Dec. 7—President Tito addresses the opening of the eighth congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists.

Dec. 13—Tito is unanimously reelected secretary-general of the Party; he is also named head of the Politburo by a new central committee. The congress ends.

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